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The rapid development in connectivity of Industrial Control Systems has created a new 
security threat in all industrial sectors, and the maritime sector is no exception. There-
fore this thesis explores cyber threats in a container terminal automation system using 
two methods: literature review and attack tree analysis. 
In this thesis, cyber threats in Industrial Control Systems were first studied in general by 
the means of a literature review. Then, the identified threats were applied to a software 
component of a terminal automation system using attack trees. Attack trees are a tool 
that helps in visualizing different cyber attacks. Based on the results, threats were classi-
fied in risk categories and the most problematic areas were identified. Finally, sugges-
tions were made on how to improve cyber security of the component assessed and of the 
terminal automation system in general. 
Based on the literature review, ten different risk categories were identified. The catego-
ries cover various attacks ranging from malware and Denial-of-Service attacks all the 
way to physical and social attacks. When assessing the software component, three prob-
lem areas were identified: susceptibility to Denial-of-Service attacks, weak protection of 
communication and vulnerability of a certain software sub-component. The suggested 
security improvements include changes to the network design, use of stronger authenti-
cation and better management of the process automation network. 
Based on the study, container terminal automation systems aren’t very different from 
other Industrial Control Systems in terms of cyber security, as they are susceptible to 
the same threats. The current cyber security posture of Industrial Control Systems is 
considered relatively poor, and container terminal automation systems are no exception. 
Therefore it is important that companies involved in the industry commit to improving 
cyber security either voluntarily or as obligated by laws and regulations. 
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Kommunikointitarpeiden nopea kasvaminen automaatiojärjestelmissä on luonut uuden 
turvallisuusuhan kaikilla teollisuuden aloilla, eikä merisektori tee tähän poikkeusta. Sik-
si tässä diplomityössä tarkastellaan kyberuhkia satama-automaatiojärjestelmässä kahta 
tutkimusmenetelmää käyttäen. 
Tässä työssä kartoitettiin aluksi automaatiojärjestelmien kyberuhkia yleisellä tasolla 
kirjallisuuskatsauksen muodossa. Tämän jälkeen tunnistettuja uhkia sovellettiin yksit-
täiseen satama-automaatiojärjestelmän ohjelmistokomponenttiin hyökkäyspuita apuna 
käyttäen. Hyökkäyspuuanalyysi on työkalu, jota käytetään kyberhyökkäysten rakenteen 
visualisoimiseen. Puihin perustuen uhat lajiteltiin riskiluokkiin ja järjestelmän ongelma-
alueet tunnistettiin. Lopuksi annettiin suosituksia siitä, miten tarkastellun komponentin 
ja koko järjestelmän kyberturvallisuutta voitaisiin parantaa. 
Kirjallisuuskatsauksen perusteella tunnistettiin kymmenen erilaista riskikategoriaa, jot-
ka kattavat hyvin erityyppisiä hyökkäyksiä aina haittaohjelmista ja palvelunestoista fyy-
sisiin ja sosiaalisiin menetelmiin asti. Työssä tarkemmin tarkastellussa automaatiojärjes-
telmän ohjelmistokomponentissa havaittiin kolme ongelma-aluetta: heikko kyky sietää 
palvelunestohyökkäyksiä, kommunikaation vähäinen suojaus sekä yksittäisen ohjelmis-
tokomponentin haavoittuvuudet. Kyberturvallisuuden parantamiseksi suositeltiin esi-
merkiksi muutoksia verkkoarkkitehtuuriin, vahvempien autentikointimenetelmien käyt-
töä sekä automaatioverkon hallinnan kehittämistä. 
Tutkimuksen perusteella satamien automaatiojärjestelmät eivät kyberturvallisuuden 
suhteen juurikaan poikkea muista teollisuuden automaatiojärjestelmistä, vaan altistuvat 
samoille uhille. Teollisuusautomaation kyberturvallisuuden nykytasoa pidetään yleisesti 
heikkona, eikä satama-automaatio tee tässä poikkeusta. Tästä syystä on tärkeää, että 
alan toimijat kehittävät kyberturvallisuutta joko oma-aloitteisesti tai lakien ja säädösten 
velvoittamina. 
iii 
PREFACE 
The topic of this thesis was given by Kalmar Global. I would like to thank Tommi Pet-
tersson and Pekka Yli-Paunu of Kalmar for giving me this opportunity and a very inter-
esting topic. I would also like to thank them for their insights on the topic and for trust-
ing me with all the information about their terminal automation system. A big thank you 
also to everyone at Kalmar who kindly took the time to discuss with me and gave an-
swers to all my questions. 
I warmly thank Professor Jarmo Harju of Tampere University of Technology, who first 
brought this opportunity into my knowledge and then on multiple occasions provided 
excellent feedback on both the structure and the contents of this thesis. 
 
Tampere, 14th of February 2016 
 
Olli Penttilä 
iv 
CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 
2. BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................... 3 
2.1 Cyber threats .................................................................................................. 3 
2.1.1 Vulnerabilities and exploits ............................................................. 4 
2.1.2 Cyber attacks .................................................................................... 5 
2.1.3 Cyber attackers ................................................................................. 6 
2.2 Cyber security in Industrial Control Systems ................................................ 7 
2.2.1 ICS networks as targets .................................................................... 7 
2.2.2 IACS cyber security standards and certificates................................ 9 
2.3 Automated container handling ..................................................................... 10 
2.4 Related work ................................................................................................ 12 
3. THREAT LANDSCAPE ........................................................................................ 14 
3.1 Malware ........................................................................................................ 14 
3.1.1 Viruses and worms ......................................................................... 15 
3.1.2 Trojan horses .................................................................................. 15 
3.1.3 Watering holes ............................................................................... 15 
3.1.4 Implications for ICS networks ....................................................... 16 
3.2 Denial of Service .......................................................................................... 16 
3.2.1 Flooding and nuking ...................................................................... 17 
3.2.2 Jamming ......................................................................................... 17 
3.2.3 Implications for ICS networks ....................................................... 18 
3.3 Spoofing ....................................................................................................... 19 
3.3.1 Packet spoofing .............................................................................. 19 
3.3.2 Implications for ICS networks ....................................................... 19 
3.4 Unauthorized access ..................................................................................... 20 
3.4.1 Passwords ....................................................................................... 20 
3.4.2 Authentication systems .................................................................. 21 
3.4.3 Privilege escalation and lateral movement ..................................... 21 
3.4.4 Physical access ............................................................................... 22 
3.4.5 Remote access ................................................................................ 22 
3.5 Software vulnerabilities................................................................................ 23 
3.5.1 Different types of software ............................................................ 23 
3.5.2 Buffer overflows ............................................................................ 24 
3.5.3 Reverse engineering ....................................................................... 25 
3.5.4 Implications for ICS networks ....................................................... 25 
3.6 Hardware vulnerabilities .............................................................................. 26 
3.6.1 Programmable Logic Controllers ................................................... 26 
3.6.2 Tampering ...................................................................................... 26 
3.6.3 Implications for ICS networks ....................................................... 27 
v 
3.7 Networking vulnerabilities ........................................................................... 27 
3.7.1 Routers and switches ...................................................................... 27 
3.7.2 Firewalls ......................................................................................... 28 
3.7.3 Network security tools ................................................................... 29 
3.7.4 Wireless networks .......................................................................... 29 
3.7.5 Network protocols .......................................................................... 30 
3.7.6 Man in the Middle .......................................................................... 30 
3.8 Misuse of process automation data .............................................................. 31 
3.9 Data breach ................................................................................................... 32 
3.9.1 Complicated attacks ....................................................................... 32 
3.9.2 Browser-based attacks.................................................................... 32 
3.9.3 Injections ........................................................................................ 32 
3.9.4 Phishing .......................................................................................... 33 
3.9.5 Data breach in reconnaissance phase ............................................. 33 
3.10 System users ................................................................................................. 34 
3.10.1 Portable devices ............................................................................. 35 
3.10.2 Social engineering .......................................................................... 36 
3.11 Cyber threats related to cloud services ......................................................... 36 
4. DETAILED THREAT ANALYSIS OF EIS .......................................................... 38 
4.1 External Interface Service ............................................................................ 38 
4.2 Motivation for attacking EIS ........................................................................ 40 
4.2.1 Interruption of container handling process .................................... 40 
4.2.2 Stealing process-related data .......................................................... 40 
4.2.3 Stealing a container ........................................................................ 41 
4.2.4 Moving a container through the terminal undetected .................... 41 
4.3 Cyber security concerns in EIS .................................................................... 41 
4.3.1 Software-related ............................................................................. 42 
4.3.2 Network-related ............................................................................. 46 
4.3.3 Physical and human-related ........................................................... 48 
4.4 Threat assessment tools ................................................................................ 49 
4.5 Threat assessment ......................................................................................... 52 
4.5.1 Attack trees .................................................................................... 52 
4.5.2 Threat classification ....................................................................... 52 
4.5.3 Attack scenarios ............................................................................. 54 
4.6 Countermeasures .......................................................................................... 58 
4.6.1 System-wide countermeasures ....................................................... 59 
4.6.2 EIS-specific countermeasures ........................................................ 69 
4.7 Summary ...................................................................................................... 73 
5. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................... 78 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 80 
APPENDIX A: ATTACK TREES 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The difference between information security and cyber security. 
Adapted from von Solms & van Niekerk [6]. ................................................. 4 
Figure 2. Timeline of a vulnerability lifecycle. Adapted from Dumitras [7]. ................... 5 
Figure 3. The phases of a cyber attack. Based on Hutchins et al. [10]. ........................... 5 
Figure 4. Location of a container handling system in the logistic chain of a port. ........ 10 
Figure 5. Hierarchy of the four core layers in the automated container handling 
system of the case example. .......................................................................... 11 
Figure 6. Location of EIS within the architecture. ......................................................... 38 
Figure 7. Components of the OSGi framework. Adapted from OSGi Alliance [74]. ..... 39 
Figure 8. Example of an attack tree. ............................................................................... 50 
Figure 9. An attack vector for a DoS attack ................................................................... 55 
Figure 10. An attack vector for data leakage ................................................................. 56 
Figure 11. An attack vector for moving Container Handling Equipment ...................... 58 
Figure 12. ICS system security program framework. Adapted from Kilman & 
Stamp [109]. ................................................................................................. 67 
Figure 13. Threat landscape of a terminal automation system. ..................................... 74 
 
Figure A-1. Attack tree: gaining knowledge on target system. ....................................... 92 
Figure A-2. Attack tree: unauthorized remote access. .................................................... 93 
Figure A-3. Attack tree: unauthorized physical access. ................................................. 94 
Figure A-4. Attack tree: flooding attacks and communication interference. .................. 95 
Figure A-5. Attack tree: physical damage and editing container map. .......................... 96 
Figure A-6. Attack tree: nuking attacks. ......................................................................... 97 
Figure A-7. Attack tree: move CHE by injecting instructions to the ICS network. ........ 98 
Figure A-8. Attack tree: move CHE through OSGi exploit. ........................................... 99 
Figure A-9. Attack tree: stealing container information and process data. ................. 100 
Figure A-10. Attack tree: more ways to steal container information. .......................... 101 
 
  
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Difficulty rating for attack tree nodes. Based on Byres et al. [94]. .................. 50 
Table 2. Description of different impact levels for attack vectors. ................................. 51 
Table 3. Attack vector enumeration and scoring. ........................................................... 53 
Table 4. Risk matrix of the attack vectors. ...................................................................... 54 
Table 6. Prioritization of attack vectors for mitigation. ................................................. 75 
Table 7. Suggested measures to improve cyber security................................................. 76 
 
viii 
TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Cryptography The science of writing and reading of secret messages 
Cyber Related to computers or computer networks 
Exploit A method to take advantage of a vulnerability 
Hardening The act of disabling unnecessary functions from software or 
hardware in order to improve security 
Malware Malicious software, designed to damage a computer or a com-
puter network 
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Port The harbor area where vessels are docked 
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Terminal An area inside a port where cargo is handled, a port may include 
multiple terminals 
Vulnerability A flaw in security 
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DCS Distributed Control System 
DoS Denial of Service 
EIS External Interface Service 
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IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
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ISO International Organization for Standardization 
JMS Java Message Service 
JVM Java Virtual Machine 
MitM Man in the Middle 
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SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
TOS Terminal Operating System 
TLS Terminal Logistics System 
XML Extensible Markup Language 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known in the field of cyber security that the recent trend of increasing connec-
tivity between Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and the Internet, or other networks, 
broadens the range of cyber threats these systems are exposed to. The following inci-
dents illustrate how control systems on different industries are equally susceptible to 
cyber threats: 
 In 2010, a computer worm known as Stuxnet was discovered. The worm was de-
signed to access and alter the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) of the Na-
tanz nuclear fuel enrichment plant in Iran, but it later infected other systems as 
well [1]. 
 In 2013, it was disclosed that the Port of Antwerp had been under a continuous 
cyber-physical attack for several years and contraband worth hundreds of mil-
lions of euros had been moved through the port repeatedly. To facilitate the at-
tacks, information systems of the port authorities were compromised and infor-
mation was stolen. [2] 
 In 2014, a cyber attack on a German steel mill prevented the operators of a blast 
furnace from shutting the furnace down controllably [3]. The resulting damage 
to the machinery was described as massive. 
As proven by the case of Antwerp, ports, and maritime industry in general, are potential 
targets for cyber attacks. Although there is plenty of information available about cyber 
security of ICS systems in general, there hasn’t been much research done on how to 
apply this knowledge on systems specific to maritime industry. In an attempt to work 
towards filling this void, this thesis collects and combines information from various 
sources to offer a comprehensive coverage of different cyber threats in a maritime ter-
minal environment. 
Before applying any security strategies, policies or technologies, one must recognize the 
assets that require protection, and the threats that endanger the security of these assets. 
Therefore this thesis concentrates on cyber threats and vulnerabilities, not on strategy or 
policy establishment. Only when the threats, and the risks they impose, have been cov-
ered, can the required countermeasures be designed and implemented. 
This thesis was conducted at the request of Kalmar Global, a worldwide provider of 
cargo handling solutions for ports, terminals and distribution centers. Therefore, mari-
time container terminal automation systems are used as a subject of study. Most of the 
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content can still be applied to other cargo handling systems and even to ICS systems in 
general. 
The structure of this thesis is twofold: first, cyber threats in terminal automation sys-
tems are explored in general, and then a cyber threat analysis is conducted on a single 
component of the terminal automation system of Kalmar. The component chosen for 
analysis is the External Interface Service (EIS), which provides a dedicated interface for 
all external communication to and from the system. Cyber security of this component is 
vital when considering confidentiality, integrity and availability of the entire system. 
The research problems considered in this thesis are as follows: 
1. What kind of cyber threats exist in terminal automation systems? 
2. What kind of cyber threats does the External Interface Service face? 
a. What can be achieved by attacking EIS? 
b. How can EIS be compromised? 
c. How can cyber security of EIS be improved? 
To answer these questions, a literature review is conducted. The review includes litera-
ture from the fields of cyber security, process automation and industrial computer net-
working in order to cover the different views on cyber security. In addition, interviews 
are conducted with process automation professionals of Kalmar to gain insight on how 
process automation is applied on container handling systems and how different cyber 
attacks might affect the process. To discover cyber threats specific to EIS, attack trees 
are constructed. Different attacks are also evaluated to provide a risk assessment.  
As is reflected by the research problems, the focus of this study is primarily on cyber 
threats and their characteristics. Due to the limited timeframe and resources of the 
study, cyber security measures and solutions are only briefly examined. As will be ex-
plained in Section 2.1, there are certain information related threats that are outside of the 
scope of cyber security, and therefore outside of the scope of this study as well. In some 
cases technical failures and software bugs can cause effects similar to cyber attacks, but 
in this study they are not considered unless they are exploited with malicious intentions. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: in Chapter 2, various terms and the container 
terminal environment are defined to provide a basic understanding of the context of this 
study. Then, in Chapter 3, cyber threats of terminal automation systems are explored, 
thus answering the first research problem. In Chapter 4, EIS is analyzed and the second 
research problem including its sub-questions is answered. Finally, conclusions of the 
thesis are presented in Chapter 5. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter relevant terminology is explained. It is assumed that the reader has basic 
understanding of Information Technology (IT) and computer networking. Extensive 
knowledge on cyber security or ICS systems, such as a terminal automation system, is 
not required. 
2.1 Cyber threats 
To understand what a cyber threat is, cyberspace needs to be defined first. Lujiif [4] 
defines it as a digital world of computers, computer networks and people, where infor-
mation is created, transmitted, received, stored, processed and deleted. In cyberspace, 
cyber attacks take place. IEC standard 62443 [5] defines a cyber attack as a successful 
exploitation of vulnerabilities in software, hardware or firmware of Internet application 
components or IT components. Here, unsuccessful attempts are considered attacks as 
well, as they may still have undesired effects on the target system. In this thesis cyber 
threat is defined as a potential cyber attack. Therefore cyber security can be defined as 
the implementation of protection against cyber threats. In this thesis the word ‘threat’ 
generally refers to a cyber threat. 
According to von Solms and van Niekerk [6] cyber security and information security 
are not interchangeable as terms. They note that while all security is about protecting 
certain assets from certain threats, the set of assets protected by information security is 
not the same as the set protected by cyber security. This is illustrated by Figure 1 on 
page 4. Generally, if an information asset is not stored or transmitted using ICT, it is not 
covered by cyber security, but it isn’t susceptible to cyber attacks either. 
For example notes written on a piece of paper or undocumented knowledge in an em-
ployee’s mind are not protected by cyber security as this information is not stored or 
transmitted in the cyberspace. On the other hand, gaining control of a physical device 
over the Internet is not considered as a threat on information security if the device 
doesn’t contain any valuable information assets. This applies even if it was possible to 
cause major financial or physical damage by attacking that particular device. What is 
considered as a valuable asset depends on the security policy of the asset owner. The 
focus of this thesis is on cyber security and specifically on cyber threats. 
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Figure 1. The difference between information security and cyber security. Adapted from 
von Solms & van Niekerk [6]. 
2.1.1 Vulnerabilities and exploits 
In the context of security, a vulnerability is a security flaw that under certain circum-
stances causes behavior that was not intended. A method that makes use of a vulnerabil-
ity is called an exploit. According to Dumitras [7] a typical vulnerability lifecycle be-
gins with the release of a vulnerable application version (see Figure 2 on page 5). Once 
the vulnerability is found, an exploit is created and released “in the wild”, for instance 
on a hacking community forum. Once attacks exploiting the vulnerability start emerg-
ing, the vulnerability becomes publicly disclosed, and soon a patch is released to re-
move the vulnerability. 
The lifecycle ends, when all instances of the application have been patched. Depending 
on the type and distribution of the vulnerable application, the time between patch re-
lease and end of lifecycle can become very long. This means that even though the patch 
has already been released, all unpatched instances of the application still remain vulner-
able to the initial exploit and other exploits using the same vulnerability [8]. 
When an exploit is released before the vulnerability becomes publicly disclosed, a term 
zero-day exploit is often used. This means that the vulnerability is exploited from the 
day zero of its known existence [8]. If the vulnerability is discovered by the application 
manufacturer or it is reported directly to the manufacturer instead of releasing it “in the 
wild”, it can be patched before an exploit is created. 
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Figure 2. Timeline of a vulnerability lifecycle. Adapted from Dumitras [7]. 
2.1.2 Cyber attacks 
A cyber attack can be divided in several phases [9-12]. Depending on the source used, 
the names and amount of phases vary slightly, but most of the models are based on the 
Cyber Kill Chain developed by Lockheed Martin. The Cyber Kill Chain consists of sev-
en phases: reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command 
& control and actions on objectives [10]. To simplify the model, three main phases can 
be recognized: preparation, compromise and action (see Figure 3). All attacks don’t go 
through all of the seven phases, but the three main phases are always present in a 
successful attack. 
In the preparation phase an attacker finds a suitable target and acquires as much infor-
mation about the target as is required (reconnaissance) [12]. Once the attacker finds a 
vulnerability, he can craft or obtain an attack tool to exploit the vulnerability (weapon-
ization) [11]. The ‘weapon’ used can be a highly complex computer virus, a simple 
string of SQL commands or anything in between depending on the vulnerability found 
and the motivation of the attacker.  
 
Figure 3. The phases of a cyber attack. Based on Hutchins et al. [10]. 
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To compromise the target, the attacker first delivers the weapon to the target environ-
ment [10]. Delivery can happen through a website, in an e-mail, on a USB memory or in 
any other imaginable way. After a successful delivery the attacker exploits the vulnera-
bility, usually to run a malicious program on the target system [10] or to gain unauthor-
ized access of some form [9]. In installation phase the attacker installs a backdoor to 
provide easy access for later use [10]. 
Once the target system has been compromised, the attacker may want to gain control of 
the target system. To achieve this, a connection between the attacker and the target sys-
tem is established (command & control) [12]. The connection provides a “hands on 
keyboard” access for the attacker [10]. At this point the attacker has gained access to 
whatever asset he was targeting, and depending on the intention the attacker can steal, 
destroy, modify or forge that asset to complete the attack (actions on objectives) [9]. 
According to a survey conducted by Kaspersky Lab [13] in 2014 the most common 
cyber threats faced by companies include spam e-mails, malware, phishing, network 
intrusion, theft of mobile devices and DoS (Denial-of-Service) attacks. According to 
another report by Kaspersky Lab [14] that focuses on ICS systems, 35% of malicious 
code in ICS networks propagates from the corporate office network, 29% from remote 
access connections and 9% directly from the Internet, while in rest of the incidents the 
ICS network is accessed directly. This means that roughly three out of four attacks uti-
lize connections to other networks in the delivery phase. 
2.1.3 Cyber attackers 
There are many different motives for cyber attacks. Sometimes attackers are individuals 
willing to prove their abilities, or so called script-kiddies trying out pre-made attack 
tools [4]. However, a recent trend has been that attackers are criminal groups with fi-
nancial profit in mind [15]. Criminal groups primarily target easily monetizable targets 
such as credit card or online banking information, but espionage, blackmailing and theft 
of physical goods are viable examples of other ways of making profit [15]. Sometimes 
attackers may also have a political agenda (e.g. activists or terrorists) [4]. 
Involvement of organized groups and money leads to more capable attackers and more 
efficient attack tools. Instead of attacking anything they can, organized attackers have 
fixed targets, so attacks also become more persistent. Even nations can use cyber attack 
tools as a part of their warfare actions, leading to the development of highly sophisticat-
ed and expensive attack methods [16]. This increase in resources needs to be considered 
when security measures are designed and implemented. 
Business competitors may be interested in obtaining information for example on pric-
ing, product development or contracting by the means of a cyber attack. Attacks can 
also come from the inside. The attacker can just as well be an employee as someone 
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from the outside. In fact, a survey by the Cyber Edge Group [17] shows, that one of five 
IT professionals in European and North-American companies are more worried about 
internal cyber threats than they are about external threats. 
2.2 Cyber security in Industrial Control Systems 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are systems that collect information from endpoint 
devices about the status of a production process and present it in an organized fashion 
[18]. According to Macaulay and Singer [18] the process controlled by an ICS can be 
manual, partly automated or fully automated. To avoid confusion, in this thesis systems 
controlling partly and fully automated processes are referred to as Industrial Automation 
Control Systems (IACS). IACS systems are considered as a subset of ICS systems. 
Macaulay and Singer [18] divide ICS systems in three categories: 
 Process control systems (PCS) allow system operators make control decisions, 
manipulating the course of the process. 
 Distributed control systems (DCS) are PCS systems, where the controller ele-
ments are geographically wide-spread.  
 Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are used to control 
large infrastructures as opposed to other ICS systems that control smaller ele-
ments. 
The use of terminology is not established among the field and for example SCADA is 
often used interchangeably with PCS or ICS [18; 19], but the definitions given above 
are used throughout this thesis. To clarify differences between the terms, consider a 
drinking water distribution system. A SCADA system would be used to supervise the 
entire infrastructure to ensure the availability and quality of drinking water. A DCS 
would be used to control for example a set of valves spread over a section of the net-
work and a PCS would be used to control a similar set of valves inside a purification 
plant. SCADA systems can be considered to be even more wide-spread than DCS sys-
tems [20; 21]. The terminal automation system considered in this thesis can be seen as a 
PCS, as it operates in a closed area, where access is controlled. 
2.2.1 ICS networks as targets 
Initially ICS networks were isolated and based on primitive serial technology that sup-
ported only minimal functionality [21; 22]. While these solutions provided little to no 
security at all, ICS networks were difficult targets for cyber attacks, as they were physi-
cally isolated from all other networks [23]. These days though, business operations re-
quire ICS networks to have more and more compatibility and connections to other net-
works, and to the Internet in particular [20; 23]. This connectivity exposes them to the 
8 
same threats other networks face, even though the devices and protocols in use may not 
have originally been designed with such threats in mind [22]. 
ICS systems have an average lifespan of 15 to 30 years [18; 23], which is considerably 
longer than the intended lifespan of most IT solutions. This means that ICS systems 
often have outdated IT technology in them, mostly because solutions covering the entire 
lifespan do not exist [24]. Outdated solutions naturally do not receive any security up-
dates or technical support so they have no protection against the most recent threats. 
The development towards Internet connectivity makes today’s ICS networks rather in-
triguing targets for cyber attackers, especially when appropriate security measures ha-
ven’t been deployed. This is also illustrated by the emergence of malware specifically 
designed to attack ICS networks. Examples of such malware are Stuxnet [1], Sasser [20] 
and Havex [25]. A recent trend in the context of malware has been targeted attacks [15; 
26]. A targeted attack means that an attacker designs a piece of malware just to attack a 
specific system. As a result attacks are getting more creative and persistent, and there-
fore more difficult to defend against. 
As a subset of ICS networks IACS networks face the same threats as all other ICS net-
works, but there are also threats that are specific to automation. These threats stem for 
example from limited processing resources, real-time systems and physical safety [20; 
24]. To provide uninterrupted production, IACS systems need to be constantly up and 
running. Therefore they tend to be rarely updated and running on outdated software ver-
sions [24]. Common cyber security measures are still applicable in industrial automa-
tion networks, but they need to be adapted to take automation specific threats into ac-
count [20]. 
ICS networks, as all networks, are exposed to attacks where data is stolen or destroyed 
and to attacks where functionality is severed. As industrial networks, they are also ex-
posed to attacks where production is interrupted. Specific to ICS networks are attacks 
where an attacker gains ability to somehow modify the process. Depending on the skills 
and objective of the attacker, changes made to the system may be random or calculated, 
resulting in controlled or uncontrolled reactions in the process. Here lays the main dif-
ference between regular IT systems and ICS systems: attacks on ICS systems can, and 
often will, cause physical consequences [18]. The added layer of physical safety makes 
ICS systems more complex to secure, and since mechanical failures and cyber attacks 
often have similar consequences, attack detection may be more difficult than in regular 
IT systems. 
One of the few publicly disclosed cases where a cyber attack has been used specifically 
to cause physical damage was reported in 2014 by the Federal Office for Information 
Security [3] in Germany. Although the report doesn’t go into detail about the progress 
of the attack, it was disclosed that the attackers used phishing attacks to gain access to 
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the corporate network and were able to propagate to the ICS network from there. Ex-
ploiting vulnerabilities in the control components, the attackers were able to drive the 
control system of a blast furnace to an “undefined state” [3]. As a result the operators 
weren’t able to shut the furnace down controllably, which, according to the report, lead 
to “massive damage to the machinery”. While there is very little information available 
about similar incidents, it is difficult to tell whether it is because such incidents are very 
rare, because they are difficult to distinguish from other failures or because companies 
do not report them in order to protect their reputation. 
2.2.2 IACS cyber security standards and certificates 
Standardizing cyber security in IACS networks is not straightforward, because there are 
multiple applicable standards and good practice guides made by various organizations. 
They are all used variably and incoherently over the field [24]. ISO/IEC 27000 standard 
family is one of the more used standard families in the IT sector in general. It includes 
multiple standards for information security management and best practices for risk 
management [24]. The standard family has been written in a fairly high level of abstrac-
tion to be applicable in the entire IT sector and it isn’t process automation specific, so 
some adaptation will be necessary. In addition there is common criteria ISO/IEC 15408, 
which provides criteria for IT security evaluation [27]. Products certified with ISO/IEC 
15408 are generally considered secure [24]. 
There are also standards specific to industrial control systems. ISO/IEC 62443 [5], 
which includes the older ISA99 standard, is a security standard for industrial automation 
and control systems. Also the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
has a series of Special Publications (SP) regarding different aspects of SCADA and ICS 
security [28]. Especially NIST SP 800-82 [29] titled Guide to Industrial Control Sys-
tems Security is worth mentioning. IEEE is also developing a new standard, named 
P1711, for a cryptographic protocol to be used for improving security of serial commu-
nications which are often used in ICS environments [30]. 
Some standards are field specific, but are still partly applicable in the context of IACS 
networks as a whole [24]. Examples of such standards are IEEE P1686, ISO/IEC 62351, 
ISO/IEC 61850 and AGA-12. No standards specifically made for IT of the maritime 
sector were found at the time of writing.  
As certification of process automation system security is not the primary subject of this 
study, extensive analysis on different certificates was not conducted. It seems though, 
that at the moment there are no major or widely accepted certificates available for ICS 
systems. Various consultation companies seem to offer their own certificates, but these 
rarely comply with any specific standards and therefore their actual quality and value 
can be questioned. 
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Even though standardization and certification of an ICS system proved to be challeng-
ing, it is still possible to train ICS cyber security specialists. The European Union Net-
work and Information Security Agency (ENISA) has recently explored these certifica-
tion programs and identified three ICS-specific certificates: IEC 62443 Cyber Security 
Certificate Program (CSCP), GIAC Global Industrial Cyber Security Professional 
(GICSP) and Certified SCADA Security Architect (CSSA) [31]. While CSCP and 
GICSP are targeted towards ICS professionals, the CSSA certificate is targeted for IT 
professionals.  
2.3 Automated container handling 
In this thesis the automated container handling system of Kalmar is used as a case ex-
ample. A container handling system provides a solution to moving and storing contain-
ers in the container yard of a terminal. In this case, a maritime terminal is examined, but 
same basics apply to inland terminals as well. 
The system acts between Ship-To-Shore (STS) cranes and container delivering trucks or 
trains as illustrated by Figure 4. The implementation of container handling varies de-
pending on system provider, physical environment, equipment used and contracts be-
tween terminal operator and system provider. The case described in this study presents 
only one of the possible solutions. 
 
Figure 4. Location of a container handling system in the logistic chain of a port. 
Container handling can be automated from two different perspectives: the equipment 
perspective and the process perspective. Automation from the equipment perspective 
means that there is no need for human operators in the handling equipment. The process 
perspective means automating the process of deciding which containers need to be 
moved and when in order to optimize loading and unloading of cargo. This thesis exam-
ines a system that has been automated from both perspectives. 
The automation system consists of four core layers: Terminal Operating System (TOS), 
Terminal Logistics System (TLS), Control System (CS), and Container Handling 
Equipment (CHE). Figure 5 on page 11 presents the hierarchy and communication 
flows of the system. 
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Figure 5. Hierarchy of the four core layers in the automated container handling system 
of the case example. 
When a container arrives in from waterside or landside of the yard, information about 
the container and its location is delivered to the Terminal Operating System. TOS then 
requests Terminal Logistics System to store the container and TLS calculates where the 
container should be stacked. In addition, TLS finds the optimal Container Handling 
Equipment to carry out the move based on type and availability of CHEs. TLS then cre-
ates a job order for Control System, which converts it into simple instructions that the 
CHE can understand. CS instructs the CHE to complete the job and the container gets 
moved to a stack. The procedure for moving containers from stacks to waterside and 
landside loading areas is basically the same. 
The physical environment in this case is the terminal area, including the container yard, 
where containers are stored in stacks and handled by CHEs. The TLS and CS software 
are running on a dedicated server that is physically located in a building somewhere in 
the terminal area. The server is usually mirrored and placed on two different physical 
locations in the yard to add redundancy. The TOS software is provided by a third party 
so it is located on a separate server in the terminal operator’s network. The system has 
multiple connections to the Internet: TOS and TLS are connected to the Internet in order 
to extend their functionality and offer remote support, while some parts of the system 
below TLS are also remotely accessible for maintenance purposes. 
CHEs are connected to the CS via wireless or wired connections, depending on their 
type. CHEs are either rubber-tyred or rail-mounted. Rubber-tyred equipment mostly 
requires wireless connections due to their high mobility compared to the rail-mounted 
equipment. The largest cranes require the highest data rate and therefore they often uti-
lize wired connections to communicate with the CS. All other connections in the system 
are typically wired. 
In terms of criminal activity ports and their terminals are desirable targets, as they act as 
hubs of maritime transport. As terminal and port operations become more and more 
Terminal Operating System (TOS)
Terminal Logistics System (TLS)
Control System (CS)
Container Handling Equipment (CHE)
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automated and the number and importance of information systems increases, cyber at-
tacks are starting to emerge as a part of other criminal actions. A high profile case ex-
ample occurred in the port of Antwerp in Belgium, where cyber attacks were used to 
facilitate drug smuggling. Drugs were loaded in containers with legitimate cargo, such 
as bananas or timber [2]. To steal information related to these containers as they arrived 
in the port, an organized crime group hired skilled hackers [2]. The hackers were able to 
penetrate the port authorities’ network and provided the criminals with all the infor-
mation required to forge documentation and pick the containers up before their legiti-
mate owners [2; 32]. 
The port authorities eventually discovered the initial breach and a firewall was installed, 
but the hackers were able to physically break in to the premises to continue their activity 
[2]. They installed wireless devices to record keystrokes and screen captures on PCs, 
effectively bypassing the firewall [2; 32]. The attack is believed to have been ongoing 
for two years, but multiple raids by Belgian and Dutch police forces ended the activity 
in 2013 [2]. The total value of drugs trafficked through the port has remained unknown, 
but the street value of contraband seized in the raids alone totaled in around £260m 
(around EUR 307m at the time) [2]. 
As the example illustrates, vulnerabilities in cyber security can have very serious and 
concrete consequences. As the content of containers is what criminals would most prob-
ably be interested in, any information about containers is likely to be stolen. Another 
likely scenario in a terminal environment would be gaining control of one or more 
CHEs to either move containers or cause collisions and physical damage. A third likely 
scenario would be a situation where the attacker is somehow able to prevent the system 
from operating, resulting in financial losses. 
2.4 Related work 
The basics of ICS cyber security have been covered in various books, such as Robust 
Control System Networks: How to Achieve Reliable Control After Stuxnet [33] and Cy-
bersecurity for Industrial Control Systems: SCADA, DCS, PLC, HMI, and SIS [18]. 
Several national authorities and other knowledgeable entities have produced books, 
whitepapers and good-practice guides to provide plenty of information about ICS cyber 
security as well. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) of UK has 
produced an ICS security good-practice guide and other cyber security material [34]. 
The U.S. Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) 
has a repository of ICS-related whitepapers, advisories and reviews [35]. In Finland the 
focus has been on cyber security of IACS systems [20; 24]. 
ENISA published a report [36] in 2011, studying cyber security aspects of the maritime 
sector in EU. The report states that the European economy is critically dependent on the 
maritime sector while the sector itself is increasingly dependent on ICT. According to 
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the report, the current security posture of the sector is weak: awareness, technical solu-
tions, security policies and governance all call for improvement. In addition the report 
suggests more collaboration among the sector to create unified policies and good-
practice guides, and to improve information exchange. 
In 2014 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a similar report [16], 
but focusing on the U.S. port facilities. The findings are parallel to the ones presented in 
the ENISA report: cyber attacks on maritime sector could have significant impacts to 
commerce; the overall security posture is poor; cyber security information is not shared 
and the current regulations do not adequately address cyber security. The report recom-
mends that cyber threats are assessed, security guidance is created and a coordinating 
council is established. The report also briefly lists different threats based on both the 
source of the threat and the type of exploit. 
A report by U.S. Coast Guard Commander Joseph Kramek [37] explores the current 
state of cyber security in U.S. port facilities. Again, the findings are very similar to the 
other reports: low security awareness, inadequate policies and technical solutions, and 
lack of standardization. Of the six ports studied in the report, only one had conducted a 
cyber security assessment and none had a cyber incident response plan. 
Maritime cyber security company CyberKeel has produced a whitepaper [38] that dis-
cusses the motivations for attacking the maritime sector and cyber defenses to defend 
against attacks. The motivations according to the paper are stealing money or infor-
mation, moving cargo and causing disruption or loss. When discussing cyber defenses, 
in addition to the technical solutions, the paper stresses the importance of “the human 
factor” and improvement in awareness about different cyber threats. 
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3. THREAT LANDSCAPE 
To discover cyber threats in terminal automation systems, a literature review was con-
ducted. Literature from the fields of cyber security, industrial networking and process 
automation was included to cover different aspects of the subject and to recognize quali-
ties specific to the process automation environment. Based on the review, numerous 
possible attack vectors were recognized and they have been classified in 10 categories: 
1. Malware 
2. Denial of Service 
3. Spoofing 
4. Unauthorized access 
5. Software vulnerabilities 
6. Hardware vulnerabilities 
7. Networking vulnerabilities 
8. Misuse of process automation data 
9. Data breach 
10. Users. 
Due to the constantly evolving nature of the threat landscape and the vast amount of 
threats, it is not possible to create an exhaustive list of all existing attacks or vulnerabili-
ties. All threats recognized were found to fit in the 10 categories above, but the attacks 
described in the following sections are examples only, and their purpose is to illustrate 
the nature of that specific category. The categories were designed to cover all threats 
recognized during this study, but as new threats are discovered, the landscape changes 
and new categories may be required. To be able to defend against these emerging 
threats, it is important to reassess the threat landscape regularly. 
3.1 Malware 
Malicious software, or malware, is a piece of software that is specifically designed to 
damage or compromise a target system [20; 39]. Malware can be divided in three cate-
gories: viruses, worms, and Trojan horses. All malware consist of two main compo-
nents: payload and propagation component. Between the three categories of malware, 
the payload can be very similar but the propagation component is what defines the type 
of a single piece of malware. [39] The effects of malware depend on the payload, but 
since they can do anything legitimate software can, possibilities are virtually endless. 
For example a Trojan known as Karagany is able to upload stolen data, download new 
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files, run executable files, collect passwords, and capture screenshots [40]. The source 
code of Karagany was leaked to public, so it is available for anyone to exploit [40]. 
3.1.1 Viruses and worms 
Computer viruses, similarly to biological viruses, can’t live on their own, but need a 
host instead. A computer virus is a piece of code that attaches to another file in the sys-
tem. Once this host file gets executed, the malicious code gets executed as well. Once 
the malware has found a host file, it is also able to replicate itself in order to propagate 
to other systems. [39] The propagation usually happens when an infected file is down-
loaded or via some portable device, such as a USB-drive or a mobile phone that has 
been connected to the infected system. 
Worms are pieces of malware specifically designed to propagate in computer networks. 
Unlike viruses, worms are independent of other files. Once a worm infects a system, it 
replicates itself and tries to send these replicas to other systems. The method of propa-
gation makes them capable of infecting numerous systems in a short space of time 
without any interaction with a human user. [39] Due to the fast spreading, worms are 
effective in creating large networks of compromised systems. These networks can then 
be used to carry out more complicated attacks. 
3.1.2 Trojan horses 
Trojan horses enter a system inside a legitimate software (hence the name). They can 
either be coded directly into the source code of the software by the producer, or an at-
tacker can embed malicious code to software made by someone else. [20; 39] A viable 
example of the latter would be taking a web browser, crafting a malicious add-on for it 
and then distributing this browser on your web page with the add-on pre-installed. The 
add-on could for example show ads or try to pick up any passwords or credit card in-
formation. Trojan horses are particularly difficult in terms of malware protection, be-
cause detecting malicious code in otherwise legitimate software is more complicated 
than detecting viruses or worms [20]. 
One significant form of Trojans is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). A RAT gives the 
attacker complete control over the target system. Once a RAT has infected its target, it 
opens a remote connection between the target and the attacker. Opening the connection 
from the target’s end allows an attacker to access targets even if they are behind a fire-
wall and therefore invisible to the attacker. [41] 
3.1.3 Watering holes 
A watering hole attack begins by infecting a web site or other resource that is often ac-
cessed from inside the target network [42]. When someone from the target network ac-
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cesses the infected resource, the malware is able to infect the target and propagate into 
the target network. While a watering hole isn’t actually a type of malware, but rather a 
propagation method for malware, it is presented here because it illustrates a different 
approach on cyber attacks. Instead of going to the target, the attacker hides and waits for 
the target to come to him, which also explains the name. Watering hole attacks also il-
lustrate the importance of collaboration between organizations in order to achieve a 
higher level of cyber security. In other words, the weakest link in the chain of security 
can sometimes be outside of the organization. Watering hole attacks are a relatively new 
phenomenon as they were first discovered in 2012 [42]. 
3.1.4 Implications for ICS networks 
For all three types of malware (viruses, worms and Trojans) ICS systems, including 
terminal automation systems, are easy targets. Since these systems often are out of date 
in terms of software and security updates, there are also more possible entry points for 
malware than in a system that is up to date. Propagation without human interaction 
makes worms especially threatening for ICS networks [20]. Malware attacks can be 
either general, targeting any system they can reach, or targeted. While targeted attacks 
are high in efficiency but low in probability, general attacks are far more common. As 
general malware typically looks for bank account information, shows advertisements or 
causes some other minor harms, they may not be particularly harmful in ICS environ-
ments. On the other hand general malware can waste computing resources, cause un-
necessary reboots or other unwanted side-effects that aren’t even intended functionali-
ties of the malware. 
As was already mentioned, different applications of malware are endless and therefore 
actions should be taken to prevent any and all infections, be they general or targeted. It 
is also worth noting that although the Internet is the main source of malware, isolating a 
network entirely doesn’t deny the threat. Infections can still enter the network through 
any portable devices with memory on them or through any new software installed on 
the system. Therefore it is important to develop and implement policies on how portable 
devices are handled, what software is installed on the system and who is allowed to in-
stall software. To further mitigate the risk, anti-virus software should always be activat-
ed, updated and properly configured. 
3.2 Denial of Service 
In a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack the objective of the attacker is to prevent a system 
from serving its clients [20; 43]. The attack may be either intentional or unintentional 
[20], meaning that a DoS can also happen for example as a side effect of maintenance 
activities or when installing new devices or software that are improperly configured. 
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There are a few different ways to intentionally deny a service, for example flooding, 
nuking or jamming. 
3.2.1 Flooding and nuking 
To flood a system the attacker needs to send large amounts of messages, for example 
TCP packets, to the target [44]. When the target system receives more packets than it 
can handle, it will either stop working or slow down significantly [44]. In both cases the 
effect is noticeable for all users of the system. Successful flooding attacks originating 
from a single source require a significant amount of resources, especially if the target 
has been designed for commercial or industrial use. To have more capacity, an attacker 
needs multiple sources to attack from simultaneously. This kind of multi-source DoS 
attack is called a Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack. Typically DDoS attacks are carried 
out through botnets, i.e. networks of compromised devices [20]. In this case the attacker 
commands the botnet to send certain kind of packets to a certain destination. 
From the target system’s point of view a DDoS attack is observed as a significant in-
crease in traffic from seemingly random sources. Since the sources seem to be random, 
it is difficult to filter the traffic generated by the attacker while allowing legitimate traf-
fic to pass. A DDoS attack is analogous to a situation in a cellular mobile network 
where all the channels in a cell are already reserved and no new calls can be made. Sim-
ilarly, if the target system is too busy handling all the requests from the attacker’s bot-
net, connections from legitimate clients are denied or at least delayed. 
One example of a DDoS attack is Blaster, which took down Microsoft’s home page in 
2003. In this attack a worm, later nicknamed Blaster, was created to compromise a large 
amount of Windows XP and Windows 2000 machines. Infected machines formed a bot-
net, which was instructed to collectively send messages to microsoft.com, successfully 
flooding the website. The attack kept the website down for two hours. [45] 
Another form of DoS, called nuking, is an attack where the objective is to crash the tar-
get system so that it stops functioning completely [43]. While flooding attacks usually 
use well-formed, legitimate packets and rely purely on quantity of packets, nuke attacks 
use malformed packets to make use of a bug or vulnerability in the target system [43]. 
The CPNI technical note [43] only considers sending malformed packets as nuking, but 
it is worth noting, that a similar DoS situation can be achieved through malware as well. 
For example a virus, that repeatedly reboots the infected system, would have a similar 
effect. 
3.2.2 Jamming 
Signal jamming or radio jamming generally refers to deliberately interfering with a ra-
dio signal. A jammer transmits at the same frequency as the target and with enough 
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power the jammer is able to override the signal of the target receiver [46]. In essence, 
the receiver can’t hear what the transmitter is saying, because the jammer is shouting 
over the conversation. For both the transmitter and the receiver it seems as if the con-
nection has been lost. 
More sophisticated jammers make use of the fact that certain wireless protocols listen to 
the transmission channel and only transmit when the channel is available. If a jammer 
reserves all channels, legitimate devices will have to wait for a channel to clear up. All 
wireless communication devices, such as Wi-Fi, cell phones and GPS receivers are sus-
ceptible to jamming. Jamming is a relatively simple as an attack vector, since jammers 
can be bought online with prices starting from less than a hundred euros and more pow-
erful units selling for a couple of hundred euros. 
3.2.3 Implications for ICS networks 
In the context of ICS networks, an obvious motivation for a DoS attack would be 
blackmailing [20]. An attacker can try and demand a large amount of money or other 
profit to end the attack. In the worst case scenario a DoS attack would interrupt the en-
tire production, which in turn might make it tempting to pay the attacker. This is not 
recommended though, as there is no reason for the attacker to actually stop the attack 
instead of continuing and demanding for more. 
DoS attacks may also be used in conjunction with other attacks. For example nuking 
any security or monitoring systems would allow for easier or undetected access to other 
parts of the network. In a container handling environment a DoS attack would most 
likely stop one or more CHEs from operating and this way harm production. 
Since DDoS attackers have virtually unlimited resources at their disposal, complete pro-
tection against them is not possible. Therefore it is important to be prepared and have 
predefined actions and roles in case of a (D)DoS attack. Network segmentation and load 
balancing are other ways to cope with such attacks. [20] It is worth noting that DDoS 
attacks are also harmful in a totally different way. If the system gets infected and be-
comes a part of a botnet, it’ll start attacking other networks as commanded by the botnet 
manager [18]. This causes unnecessary use of network resources and might eventually 
even lead to legal actions. 
Maritime ports are busy environments by nature, so most often used frequencies for 
wireless communication can easily become congested or even completely jammed. A 
cruise ship full of people arriving at the nearby harbor or the new Wi-Fi controlled sys-
tem of the neighboring terminal can cause notable decrease in signal quality and chan-
nel availability. Therefore wireless systems should at least be capable of functioning on 
multiple frequencies, but a backup system using an entirely different technology would 
be ideal. 
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3.3 Spoofing 
Spoofing in general refers to an attack, where the attacker impersonates another device 
or user. The aim of a spoofing attack usually is to deny access to the target system from 
other users, to steal information or to bypass security systems. [47] For example it is 
possible to capture network traffic of other users by setting up a rogue base station in a 
wireless network, which is known as base station spoofing. If this base station is con-
figured to route traffic to legitimate base stations, the network remains functional and 
the attack might go unnoticed for a long time. 
3.3.1 Packet spoofing 
It is also possible to spoof network packets. Packet spoofing means sending forged 
packets into the network. For example sending large amounts of IP (Internet Protocol) 
packets with a spoofed source address to a single destination would cause loss of per-
formance at the receiving end. The receiver would also try to reply to all these spoofed 
packets, which would mean that the device, whose address the attacker set as the sender 
address in order to protect his own identity, would also suffer from the attack. If the 
resources of the network are limited, this storm of packets would possibly consume 
most of the resources, harming other users as well. Results are similar to Denial-of-
Service attacks and IP spoofing is indeed often used as a DoS attack method [47]. 
Another protocol prone to spoofing attacks is ARP (Address Resolution Protocol), 
which converts IP addresses to MAC (Medium Access Control) addresses and vice ver-
sa [48]. ARP is used to link a physical device (identified by MAC) to a certain IP ad-
dress. By spoofing ARP messages, an attacker is able to alter the linking between IP and 
MAC addresses, which affects the routing of packets within the network [48]. This way 
the attacker can reroute traffic to go through his computer and capture the traffic for his 
own purposes. Spoofing ARP packets with random addresses would result in a DoS 
situation, since packets wouldn’t be able to reach their intended destinations.  It is pos-
sible to defend against spoofing attacks by filtering spoofed packets based on conflict-
ing addresses in a packet [47]. A conflict means that for example the source address is 
inside the network, but the packet is actually coming from the outside. This of course 
won’t work if the attacker is already inside the network. 
3.3.2 Implications for ICS networks 
Considering ICS networks, and IACS networks in particular, there are two types of 
spoofing attacks worth noting: control message spoofing and sensor spoofing. Control 
message spoofing means feeding forged process control messages to the network. This 
would lead to either controlled or uncontrolled changes in the process, which in terms of 
container handling would equal to the ability to move containers or cause CHEs to col-
lide or even fall over. Sensor spoofing means sending forged sensor data to the devices 
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or software that use it. Sensor spoofing would allow the attacker to hide malicious ac-
tions by sending normal-looking data while another attack is in process or trip safety 
mechanisms by spoofing sensor data that is outside of the safe range. 
These two attacks could be combined to move a container in a controlled way without it 
being visible to a supervisor. In this attack control messages are spoofed to instruct a 
CHE to move a desired container to a desired location while GPS data coming from the 
CHE is interrupted and replaced with data recorded earlier to mimic normal functionali-
ty. Data from other sensors can be also spoofed to avoid any logical conflicts that might 
trip any safety or security functions. 
3.4 Unauthorized access 
In terms of safety and physical security, access is the ability to enter a certain space or 
open a certain door. In the cyberspace access means the ability to view or modify data 
and execute programs. Access is considered unauthorized when someone gains access 
to something he shouldn’t. To control access, an Access Control Mechanism (ACM) is 
required. To access a resource, a user requests access from an ACM that makes the de-
cision on whether access is granted or denied [49]. The information needed to make the 
decision depends on the mechanism used. For example, if the mechanism is password 
protection, the decision is made based on the password a user has provided. If the 
mechanism is fingerprint recognition, the decision is based on the fingerprint of the us-
er. Mechanisms can also be combined to form a multi-factor authentication method. A 
system can require both a password and a fingerprint or either one of them. When con-
sidering a process automation environment, both digital and physical access control 
measures are required in order to keep the system secure. 
3.4.1 Passwords 
One of the simplest and most common methods for digital access control is a password. 
They are widely used, because the concept is easy for users to understand and simple to 
implement. The problem is that passwords should either be easily memorable or written 
down somewhere [39]. A password that is easy to memorize, is susceptible to various 
password guessing attacks, such as brute force attacks and wordlist attacks [39]. In a 
brute force attack all possible character combinations are tried one by one. This obvi-
ously takes time, but is easy to execute, especially since pre-made software is easily 
accessible. Wordlist attacks are only slightly more intelligent. The attacker defines a list 
of words to be tried as the password. The wordlist can for example contain most com-
mon passwords or passwords stolen from another source. Again, pre-made software is 
available for anyone on the Internet. Guessing attacks can be slowed down drastically 
by limiting the amount of consecutive login attempts from a single source [39]. 
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If passwords are strong enough to persist guessing attacks, they probably are difficult to 
remember as well, so the users are likely to write them down on small pieces of paper or 
store them in text files on their computers. When a piece of paper or a device with the 
text file in it gets lost or stolen, the risk of unauthorized access increases. The likelihood 
of this happening may not seem high when considering one person, but in a company 
with hundreds of employees the risk becomes notable. To mitigate the risk, a password 
policy should be created and employees should be trained to comply with that policy. 
3.4.2 Authentication systems 
A password can also be obtained directly from the authentication system. The 
username-password combinations are generally stored as hashes in the system [39]. 
Hashes are essentially encrypted and compressed versions of the combinations. This 
means that every time a user tries to log in, the hash is calculated based on the username 
and password, and the hashes are then compared. If an attacker is able to steal the hash-
es from the authentication system, he might try to reverse the hash algorithm to gain the 
username and password or try to come up with a combination that results in a hash that 
matches any of the stolen hashes. Hash algorithms are generally designed with these 
attacks in mind, but as computing power of processors increases, older algorithms be-
come inadequate. When choosing access control solutions, the predicted lifetime of the 
system should be compared with the expected lifetime of the hashing algorithm to en-
sure that access control remains secure throughout the lifetime of the system. 
3.4.3 Privilege escalation and lateral movement 
As modern information systems and system networks often have multiple subsystems 
with different accounts and different user groups, obtaining a single username-password 
combination may not be of much use to an attacker. For example accounts in a system 
may be different for general users than they are for administrators. Obviously the num-
ber of administrator accounts is smaller than the number of general accounts, so for an 
attacker it would be easier to steal a general user’s account. Compared to an admin, a 
general user has a more restricted ability to perform actions, so it would be beneficial to 
turn a general account into an admin account. This action is called privilege escalation 
[50]. Legitimate users can use escalation to temporarily elevate their user rights in order 
to perform an action [51]. Unauthorized privilege escalation usually happens through a 
software vulnerability. 
While privilege escalation can be described as vertical movement, moving between dif-
ferent parts of a system or network is referred to as lateral movement. As some systems 
or databases may be accessible only from certain subnets, an attacker needs to be able to 
move laterally in the network after the initial breach [15]. An example of lateral move-
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ment would be gaining access to the office network from a visitor Wi-Fi network. From 
office network it would then be possible to move further to process network and so on. 
3.4.4 Physical access 
In process automation environments physical access control is just as important as its 
digital counterpart, because attacks tend to become easier once you have a physical ac-
cess to your target [8]. Physical access control could be viewed as a part of physical 
safety, but cyber security needs to be considered as well [8]. For example installing a 
water-spraying sprinkler system in the server room causes an electric hazard, which 
poses a threat to both physical safety and cyber security, but leaving the server room 
unlocked only poses a threat to cyber security. 
There is a multitude of ways to apply access control, so they are not covered here, but 
the general policy of granting access for only those who need it is recommended. This 
includes revoking unnecessary access rights systematically. Before deciding on access 
control methods, it is important to recognize all devices, systems and data that require 
securing. 
3.4.5 Remote access 
Remote access is the ability to access organization’s non-public resources from net-
works other than the one of the organization [51; 52]. To facilitate remote access, access 
points need to be opened for connections from other networks, which exposes the sys-
tem to attacks coming from those networks. To control who is able to create a remote 
connection, an access control mechanism is required. This way an attacker can’t directly 
connect to the target network. The attacker can still try phishing (covered later in Sub-
section 3.9.4) or password guessing attacks to gain the required credentials to establish a 
connection. 
Another approach to attacking through a remote access point would be spoofing or 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks where the attacker steals data from remote connections of 
legitimate users somewhere in between the endpoints [52]. To tackle this threat, remote 
connections should always be encrypted. In a typical ICS network a strong authentica-
tion method, such as RSA SecurID card, is used for reliable authentication and a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) for secure communication [20]. 
A third possibility would be attacking the other end of the remote connection, i.e. the 
remote user’s device. This could happen for example by malware infection or physical 
theft [52]. In this context, the remote user’s web browser is particularly vulnerable. 
There is a variety of different attacks starting with the user entering a malicious web site 
and resulting either in leaked login credentials or in data breach. Examples of such at-
tacks are cross-site scripting (XSS), cross-site request forgery (CSRF) and cookie poi-
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soning attacks. While anti-virus software may be able to protect against attacks through 
web browsers, it is important to train the users to be aware of such threats. 
3.5 Software vulnerabilities 
Software vulnerabilities are faults in the software (in design or in implementation) that 
allow an attacker to somehow modify the target system or shut it down completely [50]. 
Modifying might include executing code, moving files to or from the system, removing 
data, or spying on other users in the system. Basically software vulnerabilities act as 
enablers to cyber attacks. According to Schneier [39], faults in implementation of both 
software and hardware are far more common than faults in design. Finding faults (also 
called bugs) from software code is difficult and the idea of bug-free software is impos-
sible if the size of the software is anything more than trivial. While applying good pro-
gramming practices and testing software carefully is extremely important, mitigating 
software related risks can’t rely solely on finding every single bug before releasing the 
software, as bug-free software doesn’t really exist. 
Since some vulnerabilities are almost certainly found after the software has been re-
leased, updates need to be made. In a regular office network this is not a problem, but in 
in a process automation network it would in most cases require interrupting the process, 
which obviously isn’t desired, or in some cases even possible. Making changes to the 
system running the process may also cause unexpected changes in the process. Clearly, 
updating requires planning and comprehensive testing in a simulated environment to 
cause as little delay as possible. From the cyber security viewpoint updates should be 
made as often as possible. 
3.5.1 Different types of software 
In a process automation network there are three main types of software that need to be 
considered: operating systems, custom-made applications and Commercial Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) applications. An operating system acts as a platform between the hard-
ware and the software, and decides how computing resources are divided between soft-
ware processes. An operating system is a complex system that is designed to run on a 
variety of different hardware, which makes it prone to unexpected behavior under cer-
tain conditions. Being a critical part of the system infrastructure and prone to vulnera-
bilities, operating systems are enticing targets for attackers. 
Not all operating systems are the same though. Basically two types of operating systems 
are used: Windows or UNIX-based. While Windows systems are widely used and con-
stantly updated, they also are the main target of cyber attacks. UNIX systems on the 
other hand are less consistently updated but have a smaller malware landscape. Being 
less used and tested, UNIX systems supposedly have more elusive vulnerabilities that, 
once found, may be used in zero-day attacks. 
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Custom-made applications are specifically made for a single purpose and can rarely be 
reused in other instances. The problem of custom made applications is that they typical-
ly aren’t as extensively tested as COTS applications that may already be tried and tested 
by millions of other users. COTS applications, on the other hand, have a larger user 
base, and therefore they are targeted by a larger crowd of attackers as well. This means 
that even though there might be less vulnerabilities to find, there also are more people 
looking for them. For the same reason COTS applications are more susceptible to mal-
ware attacks, whereas custom-made applications usually are only susceptible to mal-
ware attacks that are specifically targeted to that particular application. 
3.5.2 Buffer overflows 
A buffer overflow is one of the most common software vulnerabilities [39]. It is easy to 
find and easy to exploit, and therefore it was ranked third on the list of most dangerous 
software errors [53]. A buffer is a predefined place in the computer’s memory that is 
reserved for a user input [54]. The buffer has a limited size that has been set by the pro-
grammer. A buffer overflow occurs when the size of the input is larger than the buffer 
[8]. Whatever happens to be next to the buffer in the memory, will be overwritten by the 
excess of the input, in other words, the buffer is overflowed by the input [54]. 
For example if the buffer is reserved for user’s first name, the programmer may assume, 
that no first name is longer than 20 characters, so he reserves a buffer of 40 characters 
just to be safe. If a user of the program, on purpose or by accident, enters an input of 41 
characters, the last character won’t fit in the buffer and will overflow to an area on the 
memory that shouldn’t be overwritten at this point. The result of a buffer overflow de-
pends on the data that has been overwritten [54]. If any of the program code has been 
overwritten, the program will crash or become unstable as soon as it tries to execute the 
part of the program that has been overwritten. 
Accidental buffer overflows usually cause programs to crash, but cyber attackers can 
use buffer overflows in a more controlled way as well. If an attacker is able to find a 
user input that will potentially cause an overflow, he is able to inject arbitrary code into 
the memory of the target computer by entering the code as the input [8; 54]. As soon as 
the target computer attempts to execute whatever was on the memory before the over-
flow, the code of the attacker gets executed [8]. The consequences depend on the input 
code, but a knowledgeable attacker is able to even gain full control of the target [55]. 
To avoid buffer overflow vulnerabilities, all user input lengths should always be 
checked by the program before writing them into the memory. It is a simple procedure 
that programmers often overlook or forget during the programming phase [55]. There 
are also solutions that monitor the buffer stack (memory reserved for buffers) and stop 
the victim program in case of an overflow [8; 55]. This way they prevent execution of 
malicious code, but termination of the program probably has other undesired conse-
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quences as well. It is also possible to use filters that check all inputs for any susceptible 
content before they are handed over to the program [55]. These kinds of intermediary 
software have their own flaws and writing secure code in the first place is the best way 
to defend against buffer overflows. 
3.5.3 Reverse engineering 
Reverse engineering is analysis of a system to identify its components and their rela-
tionships [56]. While the term originates from hardware analysis [56], it is here consid-
ered as a method for reverting software code from a machine-readable format back to a 
human-readable format. The motivation for reverse engineering software is to find out 
what the program does and how does it do it. This information is useful for example 
when creating a discrete malware that functions as the legitimate software, but performs 
malicious actions at the same time. Such malware presumably stays undetected longer 
as the target seems to be operating somewhat normally. 
Reverse engineering is tedious work and while it used to be mainly manual, nowadays 
there are decompilers and other software that are able to do some of the work. Requiring 
a lot of work, reverse engineering isn’t something that most casual attackers would be 
interested in, but for example competitors from the same industry might be willing to 
hire more motivated hackers or software specialists to uncover your software solutions. 
3.5.4 Implications for ICS networks 
To mitigate the risk of having vulnerable software in an ICS system, it is important to 
install only software that is necessary for the operation. Any pre-installed software that 
is not needed, should be removed, web browsers and e-mail clients are especially noto-
rious for causing security issues. These measures are also steps in the process of harden-
ing the operating system. In addition, all software should be updated as often as possible 
to patch any recently found vulnerabilities. The risk can be further mitigated by evaluat-
ing cyber security when sourcing software used in the system and including secure pro-
gramming practices when producing software in-house. 
To prevent programs from interfering with each other and especially to prevent malware 
from interfering with legitimate software, it is possible to separate different programs 
into their own execution environments. This method is known as sandboxing. When a 
program is running in a sandbox, it can only access resources that have been explicitly 
allowed, while use of all other resources is prohibited [57]. This means that even a ma-
licious program won’t be able to exploit memory or files that belong to other programs. 
Software in ICS systems and especially in IACS systems can be very complicated and a 
result of a long development process, so it makes sense to protect the software from 
being copied by competitors. To make reverse engineering more difficult, software code 
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can be obfuscated. Obfuscation can be described as a method that transforms the code 
into a form where it is difficult to extract information from, while maintaining the func-
tionality of the software. The trade-off of obfuscation is increase in the code length, 
which usually affects negatively on execution times. Therefore, obfuscation methods 
and their impacts need to be tested before application. 
3.6 Hardware vulnerabilities 
In this thesis hardware vulnerabilities are perceived as vulnerabilities that are related to 
a certain device, even when the actual fault is in the firmware running on the hardware. 
Firmware is a piece of software specifically designed to control the operation of the 
device and connections to other devices. In process automation networks most com-
monly used types of hardware are Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) units and 
networking devices, such as routers and wireless base stations, which will be covered in 
the next section. 
3.6.1 Programmable Logic Controllers 
PLC units are typically used to control processes or convert and deliver sensor data 
[20]. Being programmable, PLCs have a firmware that is responsible for providing the 
intended functionality. The firmware can usually be updated, so functionality of the 
PLC unit can be improved without physically replacing it. For an attacker who wants to 
somehow modify the process, PLCs are plausible targets, especially because even today 
many PLCs are insecure by design [23; 58]. This means that security wasn’t considered 
in design or there are exploitable faults in the design that can’t be corrected with firm-
ware updates. 
As PLCs are coming down in price, there is a trend emerging where attackers can buy 
PLCs they want to compromise, take them home to inspect and experiment with, and 
then design an attack based on a vulnerability they have found. This means, that attack-
ers have virtually unlimited amount of time to find vulnerabilities as opposed to a situa-
tion where the attackers would first break in to a system and then start to look for any 
vulnerabilities. While in IACS networks attacks to PLC units are most probable, vulner-
abilities can also be found in any other hardware with firmware in them. 
3.6.2 Tampering 
In the context of this thesis hardware tampering means physical modifications to alter 
functionality. The term is usually used when modifications are made with malicious 
intentions. One example of hardware tampering is a hardware Trojan. A device with a 
hardware Trojan on it acts just as a normal device would, but under certain circum-
stances malicious actions are performed [59]. The Trojan is either planted on the hard-
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ware somewhere between design and implementation phases or the entire device can be 
counterfeited and sold as the legitimate product. It is possible to test hardware for Tro-
jans, but as the physical size of components decreases and at the same time the com-
plexity increases, comprehensive testing becomes more and more difficult and expen-
sive [59]. Similar faulty behavior can also occur due to unintentional mistakes in the 
design and these vulnerabilities can be exploited as well, so careful testing of all hard-
ware used is important not only for safety and reliability reasons, but for security rea-
sons as well. 
3.6.3 Implications for ICS networks 
There are no direct ways to completely deny hardware attacks, but much like with soft-
ware, to mitigate the risk it is advised to consider the cyber security perspective when 
choosing devices to be used. In addition secure network design mitigates the risk of 
attacks targeting PLC firmware coming from the outside. Attacks coming from inside 
the network are only slightly mitigated and attacks through physical access still remain, 
so PLC security can’t be ignored even when other security measures are in place. 
3.7 Networking vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities related to networking are essentially vulnerabilities in software and 
hardware of networking devices, but since network security is a major part of securing 
ICS systems, it is covered in this separate section. The sole purpose of a network is to 
provide the possibility to send data packets between devices, so network-related attacks 
target the data sent over the network. The data can either be stolen, modified or discard-
ed anywhere between the endpoints, i.e. the sender and the receiver(s). 
3.7.1 Routers and switches 
The purpose of routers and switches is to route packets towards their destination. This 
means that attacks on these devices will directly affect the way packets are routed inside 
the network and between other networks. As has already been discussed, they are vul-
nerable to flooding and packet spoofing attacks. Modern routers and switches are pro-
grammable and have updatable firmware in them, so, much like with PLCs, attackers 
may be able to install a maliciously modified firmware version [24]. A malicious firm-
ware might for example allow an attacker to reroute or modify any packets that happen 
to go through the device. 
Attacks mentioned above can be carried out remotely over the network, even from the 
Internet and can be mitigated by careful network design. Since routers and switches are 
physical devices, they can also be physically attacked. If an attacker can gain physical 
access to a device, the possibilities are virtually endless. To prevent any traffic passing 
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through the device, the attacker can unplug cables, switch the device off or physically 
damage it. To capture or modify data, the attacker can attach a separate device in be-
tween the cable and the switch or router. This is called a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) 
attack, where the endpoints don’t know that there is a third party in between listening to 
and possibly modifying any data sent. MitM attacks will be further discussed in Sub-
section 3.7.6. 
To mitigate the risk of a physical attack, physical access control is needed. Devices 
should be placed in locked cabinets or at least out of sight. Things like cables coming 
unplugged can easily happen by accident as well, so to speed up recovery, clear docu-
mentation of the network and all connections is recommended even if security wasn’t a 
major concern. 
3.7.2 Firewalls 
While switches and routers are designed to connect devices and networks, firewalls are 
designed to keep networks separated. They deny any unnecessary connections between 
networks [24; 60]. According to Schneier [39] a firewall is like a castle wall that keeps 
unwanted intruders outside, but allows authorized entities in and out through a gate. He 
identifies four fundamental problems with firewalls: 
1. A firewall can keep attackers outside, but if they can get inside, firewall is use-
less. 
2. The network behind a firewall can be starved by denying any connections going 
in and out. 
3. A firewall needs to cover all connections to the network, or attackers will just go 
around it. 
4. A firewall needs to somehow know which packets or connections are malicious 
and need to be blocked. 
Based on these fundamental problems, Schneier [39] recognizes three basic ways to 
compromise a firewall. One way is to go around it. Just like all large networks in gen-
eral, ICS networks have multiple access points for maintenance, remote access, moni-
toring or other similar purposes. If any one of these access points isn’t covered by the 
firewall, circumventing the firewall is possible. Another way is to trick the firewall into 
thinking that your packets are not malicious. Typically this is achieved by creating a 
small piece of malicious code that the firewall allows through. The malicious code then 
opens a connection from behind the firewall to allow the attacker in. The third way is to 
gain control of the firewall, which is usually possible through vulnerabilities in the 
firewall software or in the operating system running the firewall. 
A firewall is only effective when it is properly configured and managed. Proper config-
uration is not straightforward and depends on the network environment [60]. A good 
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practice is to use a default deny policy where all connections are denied unless they 
have been specifically allowed [20; 60]. A poorly configured firewall provides a false 
sense of security and therefore poses a threat to security [39]. 
3.7.3 Network security tools 
Network security tools are designed to find vulnerabilities and collect statistics from the 
network. Although these tools are intended for network designers and implementers, 
they are equally useful for cyber attackers [61]. Hoque et al. [61] present a wide variety 
of different tools that can be used by both defenders and attackers to test the network or 
launch attacks. Most of the tools presented are available for anyone and some of them 
have graphical user interfaces to make them user-friendly as well. The tools can be used 
in all kinds of attacks, including Denial-of-Service attacks, spoofing, network traffic 
capturing, or network scanning. 
Network scanning tools are used to find information about the target network by send-
ing carefully chosen packets and analyzing the responses. Scanning allows an attacker 
to identify devices such as firewalls or servers in the network and find possible vulnera-
bilities in them. Network scanning is typically used in the reconnaissance phase of the 
attack to gain knowledge on the network structure. 
3.7.4 Wireless networks 
In a wired network the concern of an attacker attacking a physical wire is rather trivial, 
since attacking the endpoints of a connection or the intermediary devices is easier and 
far more convenient. In a wireless network though the data sent over a wireless channel 
can be captured by anyone within the transmission range. Therefore the basic principle 
of wireless network security is to make sure that only the intended receiver can make 
use of the data sent. 
Wireless network standards used in industrial applications, such as WLAN, WiMAX 
and ZigBee, are generally based on the IEEE 802 series standards [20]. All of the 
aforementioned are capable of encrypting traffic, but if encryption has not been enabled, 
anyone within the coverage area can send and receive messages. Encryption provides 
security over the wireless channel by making messages unreadable to anyone who 
doesn’t have the key used to encrypt them. 
Even if the traffic is encrypted, an attacker might be able to obtain the encryption key 
for example from one of the endpoints or through a vulnerability in the encryption algo-
rithm. Just like password hashing algorithms, encryption algorithms get outdated as the 
calculation power of processors increases. For example WEP (Wired Equivalent Priva-
cy) encryption method used in early WLAN applications is now considered inadequate, 
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because a regular laptop PC can test all possible encryption keys in a decent amount of 
time, thus rendering WEP practically useless. 
Even if an attacker can’t crack the encryption, there are still other possibilities. The at-
tacker can for example try to disable the encryption by attacking a base station in the 
wireless network. Base stations are configured with a configuration file which is usually 
protected by a username and a password that can be attacked. An attacker can use a DoS 
attack causing unnecessary load and delay in the network. A network can also be 
jammed by reserving all available wireless channels so other devices will have to wait 
for a free channel, as was discussed in Sub-section 3.2.2. 
To improve cyber security of wireless networks, encryption should always be used. The 
problem with encryption in ICS networks is that it introduces delay and therefore 
doesn’t fit well in systems with strict latency requirements. Coverage of the network 
needs to be considered as well. The placement of base stations should be designed so 
that the coverage of the network isn’t any larger than is required by the application. The 
larger the area covered is, the easier it is for an attacker to get inside it. For example 
directional antennas can be used to control the shape and size of the coverage area. 
Physical access control is equally important. It is used to keep attackers outside of the 
coverage area and away from the devices themselves. To prevent any unintended or 
malicious changes to the configuration of base stations, strong password protection or 
other authentication methods should be used. In addition, any new devices joining the 
network should be authenticated. This will make it significantly harder to spoof a base 
station or any other network device, as was described in Section 3.3.  
3.7.5 Network protocols 
Network protocols set the rules for communication, thus making networking possible. 
Sometimes these protocols are faulty by design or one of their functions can be misused. 
Since ICS networks are moving towards better connectivity with other networks, in-
cluding the Internet, the protocols used are more or less the same than in other networks 
[20]. There isn’t much a network designer can do to improve the security of a protocol. 
Instead, threats caused by protocols need to be handled otherwise, for example with a 
firewall, anti-virus software or an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). 
3.7.6 Man in the Middle 
In a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack the attacker intercepts and modifies communi-
cated data between two or more entities [62]. It is characteristic to MitM attacks that 
from the communicating entities’ viewpoint the connection seems to be working as usu-
al. MitM attacks are analogous to wiretapping a telephone line in order to listen to a 
phone call, but with the distinction that a MitM attacker is able to modify the data as it 
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is transferred. The main prerequisite for a MitM attack is to redirect the communication 
through the attacker’s computer 
The lesson to be learned from MitM attacks is that other devices in any network or the 
data they send shouldn’t be blindly trusted. The transmission path, whether it is wired or 
wireless, shouldn’t be trusted either. To guarantee integrity and confidentiality of the 
data, it is necessary to authenticate devices and their users, and encrypt all data sent. 
3.8 Misuse of process automation data 
Vulnerabilities, as presented in previous sections, have often led to the possibility of 
modifying network packets. This section describes how modifying process automation 
data might affect the process. There are multiple desired outcomes an attacker might be 
trying to achieve, but the simplest attack would be to remove, or drop, packets before 
they reach their destination. If all packets are dropped, the entire process will come to a 
halt, but if packets are dropped selectively, for example security or safety systems could 
be bypassed. If the data traffic is unencrypted, all that is required is some knowledge 
about the network structure and the process itself. 
If the attacker is able to gain more comprehensive knowledge about the process and 
how it is managed, he is also able to make controlled changes to the messages sent be-
tween components of the system. In the container handling automation case of this the-
sis container moves are requested by Terminal Operating System (TOS) as job orders. 
Job orders contain a container ID and the location where the container needs to be 
moved. By altering these fields before the order reaches Terminal Logistics System 
(TLS), an attacker can take control of the process. If the attacker wants to stay undetect-
ed longer, he can also modify confirmations coming from TLS to trick the TOS operator 
into thinking that jobs are completed just as they were requested. 
The infamous computer worm Stuxnet behaves in a similar manner [1]. It isolates the 
control system (CS) completely from the sensors and starts mimicking the sensor data. 
As long as the sensor data sent by Stuxnet to the CS is the same as the data coming from 
the actual sensors, the process remains completely normal. As soon as the malicious 
part of Stuxnet is activated, control messages coming from the CS are dropped and 
Stuxnet takes control of the process. It also sends a previously recorded stream of sensor 
data to the CS, so for the system operators in the control room the process still seems 
normal. The case of Stuxnet illustrates how, with enough resources, knowledge and a 
suitable vulnerability, it is possible to create a highly automated attack with no human 
interaction required after the initial compromise. 
In IACS environments communication often needs to happen as much in real time as 
possible. On the other hand, cyber security measures, like encryption, in many cases 
increase latency and therefore they are currently often omitted in the favor of better per-
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formance and lower latency [20]. Instead of just discarding all security measures, the 
maximum tolerable latency of the system should be tested or calculated, and based on 
that information applicable security measures should be chosen. 
3.9 Data breach 
A data breach means that someone without the authority to do so, is able to access a 
certain data asset. The severity of a data breach depends on the value of the data. In in-
dustrial networks attackers are generally interested in assets like financial data, e-mail 
messages and classified documents. In process automation systems data related to the 
process and information about communication protocols between different components 
of the system would be useful for an attacker. In terminal automation systems any data 
related to containers and their contents is of particular interest, which was also the case 
in the Port of Antwerp example described earlier. 
3.9.1 Complicated attacks 
There are multiple attack vectors for a data breach depending on the capabilities of the 
attacker. If an attacker is able to access the physical premises of the target, he can for 
example steal a device, like a laptop, with valuable information in it, transfer data to a 
portable memory device or install a malicious device that gathers data. If physical ac-
cess is not possible, malware can be used to capture data and send it to the attacker. 
Composing malware like this requires extensive knowledge and therefore isn’t a choice 
for less experienced attackers, but pre-made attack tools that exploit certain vulnerabili-
ties can make such efforts much easier. 
3.9.2 Browser-based attacks 
If the capabilities of an attacker aren’t high enough for the attacks above, there are also 
simpler attacks that can be deployed over the Internet. Man-in-the-Middle attacks dis-
cussed in Sub-section 3.7.6, like cookie poisoning, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and 
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) are typically used in data breach purposes. These 
attack methods are fairly easy to use, but probability of a successful attack is lower, 
because they rely on an inadvertent user to trigger the attack. These attacks also require 
a web browser, which shouldn’t be necessary on all computers, especially in ICS envi-
ronments. 
3.9.3 Injections 
Industrial networks often have dedicated databases for various data assets. Interaction 
with databases usually happens through queries. A query is used to request certain in-
formation from the database. For example a query requesting all database entries with 
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the name ‘John’ in the field ‘first name’ would result in a reply with all the people 
named ‘John’ in the database. Queries can also be used to add or remove entries in the 
database. From the users viewpoint query construction is usually automated for usabil-
ity reasons. The user enters some variables into a user interface and the queries are con-
structed based on the variables [63; 64]. 
If an attacker gains access to the user interface, he may try to enter malicious inputs in 
order to perform queries that wouldn’t be possible when using the interface as was in-
tended. If the attacker knows (or guesses) the query language used, he can inject valid 
query commands directly into the user interface [64]. If inputs aren’t checked when the 
query is constructed, the malicious commands are also executed by the database. The 
ultimate result is that the attacker can access all the assets stored in the database. 
Execution of an injection attack only requires some knowledge about the query lan-
guage used by the database. When the query language is not known, the best bet is to try 
SQL (Structured Query Language), which is often used in databases. SQL injections 
have been ranked as the most dangerous software error [53]. Since the vulnerability 
isn’t in the query language itself, but in the conversion from user input to query lan-
guage, choosing a different language makes no difference security-wise. Injection at-
tacks do not always target databases. For example operating system control commands 
can be injected as well, and sometimes triggering a buffer overflow can also be seen as 
an injection too. To avoid injections, the user inputs need to be analyzed before queries 
are formed [64]. 
3.9.4 Phishing 
The target of a phishing attack is to gain information from businesses or individuals, 
usually by impersonating a legitimate authority [65]. Phishing can happen for example 
through forged web sites or e-mails. Phishers are usually interested in banking accounts, 
credit card information or something else with relatively high rewards, but phishing can 
also be used in reconnaissance phase of other attacks. The attacker can for example im-
personate a system administrator by e-mail and ask for username and password in order 
to complete some maintenance actions. Phishing attacks are always automated and tar-
get large groups of individuals or businesses [66]. Similar attacks targeting a single per-
son or a small group of people are called spear-phishing attacks. 
3.9.5 Data breach in reconnaissance phase 
Data breach methods can be used in the reconnaissance phase of an attack to retrieve 
information about the target network or about devices and users in it. In this case the 
attacker would be interested in for example [26]: 
 File names and directory listings. 
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 Internal IP addresses, names and types of devices, especially databases, man-
agement servers or log servers. 
 External IP addresses and subnet address ranges. 
 URLs for Intranet pages. 
 Information about any services that can be accessed remotely, such as VPN or 
e-mail. 
 List of open ports in firewalls. 
 Lists of usernames and/or password hashes. 
 Anti-virus software and other security products used. 
The list above is not exhaustive and targets always need to be assessed case-specifically, 
but shows that protecting information about the network is as important as protecting 
information in the network. 
3.10 System users 
In the previous sections a multitude of threats have been discovered and explained. 
Most, if not all, can be tackled with technological solutions. Even if all the necessary 
solutions were in place, properly configured and maintained, the system still remains 
vulnerable. It is often said that users are the weakest link in the chain of cyber security 
[13; 39; 67]. According to a recent study [17], “Low security awareness among employ-
ees is the greatest inhibitor to adequately defending against cyber threats”. This means 
that it is the system user, who often opens doors for attackers, both literally and figura-
tively speaking. 
In some cases doors are opened by accident. In fact, 11% of all cyber security incidents 
in ICS systems are caused by mistakes made by operators [14]. Sometimes users bypass 
security measures deliberately, because they make work more difficult, prevent access 
to a certain website or cause some other inconveniences. This phenomenon is well-
known not only in the field of security, but in safety as well. 
Because security and safety measures tend to have a negative effect on usability of the 
system, users start to figure out ways around them, usually with little understanding on 
how it affects the security of the entire system [67]. Simple things like writing pass-
words down on a piece of paper or leaving authentication disabled on a wireless access 
point improve usability, but at the same time attacking becomes easier. For this reason it 
would be beneficial to take the usability viewpoint in consideration when comparing 
different security measures. 
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) has put together a good 
practice guide [68] on how to improve cyber security skills and awareness of employees 
in ICS and SCADA environments. The guide describes three main principles: 
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1. Increase ongoing awareness. 
2. Establish training frameworks. 
3. Develop working relationships. 
Increasing awareness helps employees to understand why security is needed and the 
business impact of security breaches. It is also important that the employees know what 
to do in the event of a security incident. Many attacks at some point require some form 
of interaction with a human target, which means that knowledgeable employees can 
prevent attacks. 
Training provides the employees with the necessary skills to carry out their work with-
out endangering cyber security. Relationship development refers to the fact that in ICS 
environments cyber security should be created collaboratively applying the best 
knowledge from both IT and process control fields. Effective collaboration between the 
two communities improves not only cyber security, but staff utilization and cost man-
agement as well. [68] 
3.10.1 Portable devices 
Portable devices are efficient tools in delivering malware to a target system, since over 
time they will most likely be attached to many different devices and connected to many 
different networks. A NIST good practice guide [52] actually states that it should be 
assumed that portable devices will become infected, so they should be treated accord-
ingly upon connection. Infected devices such as laptops or USB-drives are significant 
threats in office networks, but they can just as well be utilized when attacking ICS net-
works too. 
One possible case would be a system operator who wants to install some program (for 
example a game) on his work desktop to make his work easier or just to pass time. The 
work desktop isn’t most likely connected to the Internet so he installs the program to his 
USB-drive on his own computer (which happens to be infected with a worm) and plugs 
it in at work. Since the worm is programmed to attach to any new peripherals, it propa-
gates first to the USB-drive and then to the work desktop. Soon the worm will infect all 
other computers on the ICS network. There are two noteworthy things in this example. 
First, a single ill-advised employee was able to infect all computers on the network. 
Second, even isolating the entire ICS network from the Internet wouldn’t have prevent-
ed the infection.  
In 2013 the entire computer network of the Cook County Department of Highway and 
Transport was shut down due to a virus infection. Apparently the virus was allowed in 
by an employee using a flash drive from home or surfing the Internet [69]. Around 200 
computers were infected and it took five IT-technicians nine days to clean the system 
[69]. This example illustrates how seemingly small mistakes by users can lead to quite 
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significant consequences. In 2012 Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Re-
sponse Team (ICS-CERT) reported [70] two separate but very similar incidents, where 
malware infected a power generation control system. In both cases the root cause turned 
out to be an infected USB-drive [70]. 
3.10.2 Social engineering 
Even when the users are well trained and rarely make mistakes by themselves, a clever 
attacker can persuade or trick a user into a slip-up. A simple example would be a situa-
tion where an attacker pretends to have forgotten his keys inside and ask for a legitimate 
employee to open the door for him. If that doesn’t work, he can pretend to be a repair-
man with hands full of tools and wait for someone to politely open the locked door for 
him. Attacks like this are referred to as social engineering. They typically rely on peo-
ple’s willingness to help [39]. 
Social engineering works over the Internet as well. All an attacker needs is e-mail ad-
dresses and some other personal information about one or two employees in his target 
company. He can then send e-mails impersonating the system administrator and ask for 
username and password to perform maintenance, or he can send a malicious software 
disguised as a software update and instruct the employees to install it immediately. In 
addition, Schneier [39] mentions multiple cases where social engineering has been used 
over the phone. 
3.11 Cyber threats related to cloud services 
There are two main concepts on how cloud services can be utilized in ICS environ-
ments. Either a cloud service is used for data acquisition and distribution purposes, or 
the entire ICS system is run on a cloud platform. The latter concept is better suited for 
highly distributed control systems, such as smart grids or water supply systems [71]. 
Accordingly, the first concept is more suitable in the context of terminal automation. 
Although cloud computing is relatively new technology in the field of ICS, it has been 
suggested that system performance and availability could be improved while total cost 
of ownership could be reduced using cloud services [71]. When applying cloud technol-
ogies, there are some security issues to be considered. First concern is storage of the 
data: data of different users can be separated either physically or virtually. Virtual sepa-
ration means that data of different users can be located on the same physical hard drive, 
but the virtualization software keeps one user’s data separated from everyone else’s data 
[72]. In theory this is equally secure to physical separation, but in practice virtual sepa-
ration may sometimes fail due to a programming error or some kind of malfunction. In 
this regard it would be beneficial to assess the consequences of stored data leaking to 
the public before making a decision on moving that data to a cloud [73]. 
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Another concern is the physical location where the service is hosted. Different countries 
have different laws about data management and the physical environment poses its own 
threats [71]. The maintenance and equipment contractors used by the service provider 
affect the security of the cloud service as well [72]. Connections in and out of the cloud 
need to be secure as well. Proper encryption and authentication provide secure connec-
tions, but if the purpose of the cloud is to distribute data to third parties, their endpoints 
need to be secure too. None of the aforementioned security features serve any purpose if 
an attacker is able to compromise a third party and use a legitimate account to access the 
cloud. 
If a service provider is able to provide the required level of security and a contract is 
made, according to the Finnish National Cyber Security Centre [72] it is important to 
agree at least on the following three topics: 
1. What is the level of availability provided by the service? What is the maximum 
latency tolerated? 
2. What is the level of user support? What is the response time during weekdays? 
What about weekends and public holidays? 
3. Where is the data stored? Who is allowed to modify it? 
The agreement on these topics is called a Service Level Agreement (SLA). An SLA can 
also include agreement on how performance of the service is measured and what sanc-
tions are imposed if the performance metrics are not met [72]. 
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4. DETAILED THREAT ANALYSIS OF EIS 
This chapter presents a threat analysis of External Interface Service (EIS). First, in Sec-
tion 4.1, the purpose and structure of EIS are described. Then, in Section 4.2, the differ-
ent motivations for attacking EIS are explained based on the functionality and data han-
dled by EIS. In Section 4.3 cyber security concerns related to EIS are explored. Tools 
used to carry out the threat assessment are described in Section 4.4 and results of the 
assessment are presented in Section 4.5. Based on the findings in Sections 4.3 and 4.5, 
suggestions are made in Section 4.6 on how to improve cyber security. Finally, the find-
ings of this study are summarized in Section 4.7. 
4.1 External Interface Service 
External Interface Service (EIS) is a software component of Kalmar’s Terminal Logis-
tics System (TLS). The purpose of EIS is to provide an interface for communication 
with external systems, such as a Terminal Operating System (TOS) or any other 3rd 
party systems. EIS also inspects and routes all messages coming to TLS from the third 
party systems. In practice, EIS is primarily used to send and receive container move 
requests and container yard status data between TLS and TOS. The general architecture 
is presented in Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6. Location of EIS within the architecture. 
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EIS is built on the OSGi architecture. OSGi is a specification that defines a dynamic 
component system for Java [74]. OSGi runs on a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to pro-
vide independency from the native operating system. In the OSGi architecture function-
ality is created with bundles that are essentially Java Archive (JAR) files [74]. Bundles 
can be installed, started, stopped and uninstalled without stopping the JVM, which 
means that bundles can be swapped or updated without interrupting the entire automa-
tion process. 
In EIS there are separate bundles for example for TCP/IP communication handling, per-
sistence handling and naming conversions [75]. EIS can also be adjusted to fit different 
customers’ needs through project specific customization bundles [75]. In the scope of 
this study, there is no need to gain deep understanding on how OSGi works, but the 
framework is presented in Figure 7. OSGi framework is thoroughly described in the 
specification [74]. 
 
Figure 7. Components of the OSGi framework. Adapted from OSGi Alliance [74]. 
The JVM runs on a VMware virtualization product called vSphere, which allows multi-
ple instances of JVM to be run on the same physical server machine [75]. This means, 
that all components of TLS, including EIS, are run on separate virtual environments, but 
on a single physical machine. While the components share their processing and memory 
resources, in theory the virtualization prevents them from interfering with each other. 
The components still can, and need to, communicate with each other over a virtual net-
work as if they were on physically separate machines. To add redundancy, the physical 
machine is linked to an identical hardware setup in a different physical location, so in 
case of a failure, the execution can be moved over to the secondary hardware. 
To communicate with other components, EIS uses a Java Message Service (JMS) bro-
ker called Apache ActiveMQ. Messages are encoded in Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) format, so they are practically human-readable. To provide Quality of Service 
(QoS), messages are queued until the receiver is available to receive them, i.e. the mes-
sages are persistent. Persistence is required to make sure all messages get delivered and 
stay in the correct order even if the receiver is not available at all times. On network 
level EIS utilizes TCP/IP protocol suite. 
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4.2 Motivation for attacking EIS 
EIS acts between two major components (TOS and TLS) of Kalmar’s terminal automa-
tion system and handles practically all of the communication between them. This means 
that most of the information interesting for an attacker either constantly flows through 
EIS or is accessible for it. In addition, the level of abstraction in messages handled by 
EIS is suitable for exploits. For example giving instructions to a CHE meter-by-meter 
directly from the Control System would be a tedious task, while a CHE can be instruct-
ed to move a container with a single XML-formatted message from EIS. On the other 
hand EIS doesn’t have any long-term data storages, so it’s not an ideal target for data 
breaches. 
In terms of terminal automation systems in general, four significant attack motives can 
be recognized: 
 Interruption of container handling process. 
 Stealing process-related data. 
 Stealing a container. 
 Moving a container through the terminal undetected. 
4.2.1 Interruption of container handling process 
Motivation for interruption of container handling process can vary from random attacks 
coming from the Internet to cyber terrorism. Even hostile nations could be involved, 
which means that attacks can be highly sophisticated and persistent. Interrupting the 
process can be seen as a Denial-of-Service attack and indeed most attack vectors make 
use of typical DoS attack methods. Terminal automation systems are fairly susceptible 
to DoS attacks, because they typically rely on availability of all the components of the 
system. 
In most DoS cases a well-chosen target component can bring the entire system to a halt. 
In this regard EIS is critical: being the dedicated component to communicate with TOS, 
preventing the communication would stop CHEs from getting new job orders, thus leav-
ing them idle. Consequences of a DoS attack would be mostly financial, but physical 
damage due to collisions is possible as well. CHEs have advanced safety features to 
prevent any collisions, but cyber attackers may be able to disable them or cause unusual 
situations that haven’t been taken into account when designing these features. 
4.2.2 Stealing process-related data 
Leakage of data related to container handling process would most likely involve an in-
dustry competitor who is interested in the performance of the system. Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI), such as fuel usage, utilization rate, number of container moves per 
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hour and similar data may not seem useful for a general hacker, but a dishonest com-
petitor may be willing to pay for them. As was already mentioned, EIS doesn’t store 
such data, but it is possible to capture the data as it passes through EIS using Man-in-
the-Middle type of attacks. EIS doesn’t handle any information related to the monetary 
flows of the terminal so attackers targeting bank transfers or similar data would have to 
find other targets. 
4.2.3 Stealing a container 
The motivation for stealing a container full of valuable cargo is obvious. To steal a con-
tainer, an attacker would have to instruct the system to move the desired container to a 
desired location, for example on a trailer of a truck, and take it away before the legiti-
mate owner arrives to pick it up. For the purpose of stealing a container both content 
and location information of containers might be useful for an attacker. The location can 
be obtained for example from messages flowing through EIS, but the exact content of 
containers isn’t stored in the system, as it isn’t really relevant from the viewpoint of 
container handling. 
However, the ISO 6346 coded container type is obtainable and this code may give a hint 
on the content. For example code S1 refers to an automobile container [76]. Most of the 
codes aren’t as specific about the content, but with some experience and knowledge on 
industry practices it should be possible to tell which containers are potentially more 
valuable than the others. Additionally, container information is needed to bind a physi-
cal container with its digital representation in the system, which is necessary when ex-
ploiting EIS to move a certain container. 
4.2.4 Moving a container through the terminal undetected 
Moving a container through the terminal from a vessel to a truck trailer or vice versa is 
certainly the most demanding of the four goals, but it is also the most useful for criminal 
purposes. Therefore criminal groups may be willing to invest a lot of money and effort 
into such attacks, which leads to complicated and well-planned attacks. Moving a con-
tainer through the terminal requires much more than just a cyber attack on EIS, so it is 
not possible to fully assess this threat without the assessment of the entire environment. 
In this study the threat is only considered to find out if exploiting EIS would have any 
contribution to an attack like this. 
4.3 Cyber security concerns in EIS 
When discussing with Kalmar employees about EIS, it became clear that reliability and 
performance have been the main objectives during design and implementation. Because 
cyber security often contradicts with these objectives, it hasn’t been given much empha-
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sis. Instead, it is assumed that the environment where EIS is used has been appropriately 
secured. While this kind of “hard shell protecting a soft core” mentality is valid as long 
as the outer shell remains impenetrable, it becomes useless as soon as an attacker is able 
to bypass that shell of security. Therefore a multi-layer approach, termed as “defense-in-
depth”, is often recommended [15; 19-21; 29]. This approach implies that getting past a 
single layer of security doesn’t grant access to every asset and to access the most valua-
ble assets, an attacker would have to be able to bypass multiple layers. Applying the 
layered approach means implementing security to EIS as well as to other components. 
To find the most useful solutions for securing EIS, security concerns related to EIS need 
to be discussed first. Security concerns have been assessed from three viewpoints: soft-
ware, network and physical security concerns. Because the network and physical as-
pects depend on the actual environment where the system is applied, a single container 
terminal was chosen to be assessed. As the environment can be different in other termi-
nals, some concerns may not apply to them. Respectively, it is possible that other termi-
nals have concerns that haven’t been identified here. 
4.3.1 Software-related 
EIS utilizes different Java-based components, all of which have their own vulnerabili-
ties, and the operating system also has its own security flaws. This sub-section discusses 
those vulnerabilities and possible outcomes if they are exploited. Of course there is also 
plenty of custom code on top of the OSGi platform and although a code review isn’t 
included in this thesis, the importance of secure programming practices is discussed as 
well. 
OSGi 
The OSGi platform is a common Component-Based System (CBS) that is often used in 
embedded systems and application servers [77]. The wide usage means that the security 
of OSGi has already been discussed and a variety of vulnerabilities have been disclosed 
[77; 78]. The reports of Parrend & Frénot [77; 78] explore attacks against the Ja-
va/OSGi platform itself and attacks from a malicious bundle against a legitimate one. 
They recognize three possible consequences from these attacks: unavailability of the 
system, performance degradation or unauthorized access. When considering EIS, the 
first two of these directly contribute to the “interruption of container handling process” 
attack motive. The last one mostly contributes to the “stealing process-related data” 
motive, but could also be used as a reconnaissance method to acquire knowledge about 
EIS and its functions. 
Attacks leading to unavailability try to stop execution of certain bundles or shut down 
the entire OSGi platform while attacks leading to performance degradation start infinite 
or redundant processes to waste processing resources [77]. Unauthorized access in 
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OSGi can mean access to private data of other bundles or even access to the underlying 
operating system [77]. If attackers are able to access the operating system through EIS, 
they can also try to compromise other software components running on the same operat-
ing system. 
Attacking OSGi usually happens through a malicious bundle [77]. Creating the bundle 
itself is relatively simple and only requires basic Java programming skills, but to exploit 
other bundles, an attacker would have to possess extensive knowledge on how the sys-
tem actually operates. Naturally such information is difficult to obtain and requires de-
termination from the attacker. Some Denial-of-Service attacks, such as shutting down 
the OSGi platform, do not require knowledge about other bundles, but the outcome of 
such attacks is fairly limited in the sense that they can only be used to interrupt the pro-
cess, which admittedly is a serious consequence in itself. 
While it would be difficult to obtain the information required to create an effective ma-
licious bundle, it would also be very useful for the attacker. Reflecting the attack moti-
vations, it would be possible to capture process-related data or inject container move 
requests without having to breach encryption or any other network level security sys-
tems. In the worst case scenario an attacker would be able to completely take over the 
process, much like in the Stuxnet incident discussed in Section 3.8. Therefore it is justi-
fied to assume that highly capable instances, such as criminal or terrorist groups, would 
be willing to make the investments required to carry out such attacks. 
Virtualization 
Virtualization is implemented on two different layers, both of which have their own 
security concerns. The OSGi framework runs on a Java Virtual Machine (JVM), and the 
JVM runs on the vSphere environment. JVM is required, as it is a part of the OSGi 
framework, and the purpose of the vSphere environment is to make it possible to run 
multiple JVMs on a single server, so both layers of virtualization are needed. 
JVM offers an isolated execution environment, a sandbox, where applications, such as 
EIS, can be executed without any interference from other software running outside the 
sandbox. Despite the security model included in JVM, under certain conditions it is still 
possible for example to freeze the JVM, leak data or prevent termination of bundles 
[79]. While a frozen JVM and data leakage have obvious consequences, preventing ter-
mination of bundles may cause either resource exhaustion or alternatively an attacker 
can exploit it to prevent the system administrator from terminating a malicious bundle. 
In such case the administrator would be forced to shut down the entire JVM to stop the 
malicious bundle [79]. 
While the aforementioned exploits happen inside the JVM, escaping the virtualization 
sandbox of vSphere poses a whole different threat. Since EIS is running on the same 
physical server than other software components, it is possible to find a vulnerability in 
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EIS, OSGi, JVM or vSphere that allows attackers to leave the sandbox and attack other 
software components. Similarly, attackers can find their way to EIS through those other 
components. This means that even though EIS in itself isn’t accessible directly from the 
Internet, remote attacks are still possible if any other component on the server cluster 
has Internet access and the attacker is able to break out of that component’s virtual envi-
ronment. 
JVM is also known to be susceptible to a phenomenon called aging [80]. Aging means 
that applications running long periods of time without interruptions cause for example 
memory depletion and decreasing of performance [80]. While aging is not something 
that could potentially be exploited by an attacker, it can still be considered as a threat 
because it can cause the system to hang or become unstable. This is especially true for 
EIS and other software components of the system that see minimal downtimes and are 
expected to be constantly running and available. 
ActiveMQ 
ActiveMQ is not a component of EIS, but rather a message broker that EIS among other 
components uses as a service for communication. To facilitate persistent messaging, 
ActiveMQ has queues for point-to-point messaging and topics for point-to-multipoint 
messaging [81]. The purpose of queues and topics is to store messages until the receiver 
is ready to consume them. 
As was noted before, communication is an important part of EIS’ functionality, so se-
cure communication plays a major role when securing EIS. ActiveMQ offers two secu-
rity measures: authentication and authorization [81]. Both are optional to use, and cur-
rently Kalmar’s solution implements neither. Consequently, there is no control over 
which clients are allowed to read messages from a certain queue or topic. As Kalra [81] 
illustrates, it is possible for attackers to set up their own messaging clients and start con-
suming messages. Messages can be consumed with or without removing them from 
queues or topics, so it is possible to either disrupt messaging by removing messages or 
read messages without altering the process [81]. 
Kalra also presents a security assessment tool called JMSDigger, which is dedicated to 
testing ActiveMQ-based applications. Among other features JMSDigger is able to re-
trieve messages from queues and topics. The tool is available for anyone to download 
for free [82]. While the tool was designed for security professionals, it is just as useful 
for attackers. 
Flooding attacks filling ActiveMQ queues or topics with unnecessary messages were 
also considered, but it was concluded that it would take a fairly significant amount of 
time and messages to cause any noticeable delay. This is due to the memory capacity of 
the queues and topics, and greater tolerance of delivery delay in EIS compared to some 
other components. 
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ActiveMQ also provides the possibility to assign different priority values for messages, 
but this feature is not used in this system. Therefore it is not possible to abuse prioritiza-
tion by flooding the system with crafted messages assigned with the highest possible 
priority, thus preventing or slowing down delivery of any messages with lesser priority. 
Operating System 
The Kalmar Terminal Logistics System (including EIS) is currently specified to be run 
on a Windows Server 2008 R2 Operating System (OS) [75]. As all other OSs, this one 
comes with its own set of vulnerabilities [21]. According to Common Vulnerability 
Enumeration (CVE) [83] the OS has been affected by more than a hundred publicly 
disclosed vulnerabilities during its lifecycle. Patches are of course released to fix these 
vulnerabilities as they are disclosed, but the problem is that these updates aren’t being 
installed regularly, but only during other maintenance operations, if even then. From the 
business viewpoint these maintenance breaks should be as few and far between as pos-
sible, so the intervals between update release and update installation tend to become 
lengthy. As was already discussed in Section 3.5, software updates may also cause un-
expected changes to the behavior of the OS. 
Being the underlying system, the OS controls all other software that is running on it. It 
also provides access to the configuration files of all the other software, such as the JVM 
and EIS. Even if an attacker doesn’t have the knowledge to exploit these files, it is pos-
sible to remove them or some other important data. Therefore it is critical to ensure that 
OS can’t be exploited. 
Kalmar currently suggests the use of a client-server anti-malware product in order to 
protect the server [75]. It is also suggested that the program is only updated manually 
during other maintenance operations to avoid any excess network traffic [75]. Lengthy 
update intervals lower the detection capability of the anti-malware program and the sys-
tem remains susceptible to the latest malware and other recently emerged exploits. 
Software design 
The last software-related security concern is the EIS software itself. In this case the 
software is in the form of bundles that are written in Java programming language. While 
Java is an inherently more secure programming language than for example commonly 
used C or C++, it has certain pitfalls that the programmer needs to be aware of [84]. 
Some of these are specific to Java, while some are common to all programming lan-
guages. 
Howard et al. [85] present 24 common programming flaws that lead to security vulner-
abilities. Eight of these were identified to be applicable to EIS: 
1. Buffer overflows: while Java isn’t as prone to overflows as for example C, they 
are still possible. 
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2. Integer overflows: integer arithmetic using binary representation will under cer-
tain conditions produce incorrect results. Incorrect results of course have an im-
pact on further calculations. 
3. Format string flaws: if inputs are not checked for appropriate length or syntax, 
an attacker may be able to read from or write to memory. EIS handles and re-
structures messages, so malicious changes to these messages could result in ex-
ploitation. 
4. Command injections: similar to format string flaws, but command injection re-
fers specifically to using control commands as the malicious input. When suc-
cessful, allows execution of any control command, leading to takeover of the 
system. 
5. Failure to handle errors correctly: if errors aren’t handled correctly, the system 
may end up in insecure, possibly unstable state. Exploited by Denial-of-Service 
attacks. 
6. Information leakage: Howard et al. use the term to describe a situation where in-
formation about the system is exposed to an attacker. For example software ver-
sion numbers and detailed error messages help an attacker to identify vulnerabil-
ities. 
7. Race conditions: a situation where a variable is changed between time-of-check 
and time-of-use. Even if the variable is valid at the time-of-check, it may have 
been changed by a malicious actor before the time-of-use. 
8. Executing code with too much privilege: using the lowest level of privilege pos-
sible mitigates the consequences in case something goes wrong. If an attacker is 
able to gain control of the execution process, the possible actions depend on the 
privileges that have been given to the process. 
4.3.2 Network-related 
When assessing the security of EIS, it is important to also assess the security of the net-
work around EIS. Accessibility of a network and the devices in it often determine how 
easy or difficult the initial break-in is. This of course applies to remote attacks only, 
physical attacks, including physical access, are considered later in Sub-section 4.3.3. 
Network design 
The network where EIS is located includes TLS, CS and CHEs, so let’s call it the pro-
cess network.  A firewall is used to control access to the process network from TOS and 
the Internet. According to network documentation, the process network can be accessed 
over the Internet through a VPN connection from Kalmar’s Intranet, but direct access is 
not possible. This would make remote attacks more complicated, but eliminating direct 
access doesn’t guarantee security, as attackers or malware may still propagate from 
neighboring networks or through portable devices. Upon closer inspection, the firewall 
was found to be misconfigured and reachable from the Internet, which makes it also 
visible to network scanners that systematically scan the Internet for vulnerable targets. 
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There is also a remote control desk, which allows controlling the Container Handling 
Equipment remotely. From the process network’s viewpoint the desk is a workstation 
that is directly connected to the process server. There are also other workstations inside 
the process network to provide monitoring capabilities. These workstations can be used 
as an intermediary to attack the process server. The process server is the server that runs 
all software required by the automation process. 
Virtual Local Area Networks (VLAN) are used to separate different functions to their 
own virtual networks. While VLANs make the network more manageable and can be 
thought of as a security feature, they also introduce new security concerns if they are not 
configured properly. In theory VLANs prevent devices of one VLAN from communi-
cating with devices in another VLAN, which will also limit accessibility for an attacker. 
It has been shown that there are vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to “hop” between 
VLANs and send messages between them [86]. Nowadays though, these vulnerabilities 
are well known and they can be mitigated by correct configuration of the VLANs [87]. 
Encryption and authentication 
Any communication inside or across the boundaries of the network is unencrypted, 
which means that messages can be captured from and injected to the network. The abil-
ity to capture and inject messages is a major part in achieving any of the four attack 
motivations, as Section 4.5 will demonstrate. Capturing messages could reveal infor-
mation on how the system works or what the containers may carry, while injecting mes-
sages can alter the course of the container handling process or stop the process entirely.  
Devices in the network are protected with a username-password combination to prevent 
unauthorized access, but reviewing internal documentation revealed that combinations 
are fairly generic and susceptible to guessing or bruteforce attacks. In addition, new 
devices joining the network are not authenticated, so adding a malicious device to the 
network is simply the matter of gaining physical access to the premises. The messages 
are not authenticated either. Although they are kept in sequence with a sequence num-
ber, it is trivial to calculate a valid sequence number as it is only checked that the num-
ber has not been used yet, meaning that the numbers don’t even have to be consecutive. 
Networking devices 
There are a few different network switches from two manufacturers used in the network. 
Review of the configuration files revealed that the switches are remotely configurable 
and password protected. All switches allow configuration over an encrypted HTTPS or 
SSH connection, but many of them also allow insecure HTTP or Telnet connections. 
The problem with HTTP and Telnet protocols is that they deliver all communication, 
including passwords, unencrypted. Remote configuration allows network administrators 
to change settings of a switch without having to go to the physical location of the de-
vice. While this is a useful feature, it may also allow an attacker to alter the routing 
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rules in the switch, redirecting all packets through the attackers’ computer or some other 
capturing device. The only perimeter protecting the switches is the username-password 
combination, which was already found to be susceptible. 
As was already noted, the firewall between TOS and TLS is visible to the Internet due 
to a misconfiguration. This poses a significant threat, as the firewall is the only connec-
tion between TOS and TLS, which means that failure of that connection would stop the 
entire process. For example a simple flooding attack from a botnet could bring the fire-
wall down and depending on the capabilities of the local employees it might take any-
thing from minutes to days to locate and fix the problem. 
Failure of the firewall has been taken into account in network design and there is a 
backup firewall, but there is no automatic switch-over system in the case of a failure, 
which makes the failure easy to fix, but only after it has been identified. Looking at the 
network documentation, it isn’t apparent whether the backup firewall is supposed to be 
connected to the Internet in the event of a failure. A flooding attack from the Internet is 
likely to continue as soon as the backup firewall is put online, so instructions should be 
clear on how to configure the backup firewall in such incidents. 
4.3.3 Physical and human-related 
Based on discussions with Kalmar employees, physical security of the terminal in ques-
tion has room for improvement. There are no strict access control policies in place and 
physical access control is susceptible to social engineering attacks. Process servers and 
networking equipment have been placed with easy maintenance in mind so they are not 
behind locked doors or away from plain sight. An attacker pretending to be a repairper-
son or Kalmar employee would have easy access to vital components of the system and 
plenty of time to fiddle with them. 
It is well known that with a physical access to the device a skillful attacker is able to 
bypass any security measures that might be in place. Therefore such attack vectors need 
to be considered even though they might seem fairly unlikely to happen. Even if attack-
ers weren’t able to access the servers or any other devices, they can leave malware in-
fected USB-drives lying around or look for any notes with passwords on them near the 
workstations. 
Unlike to the site, access to the container yard is strictly controlled for safety reasons. 
Despite strict control, it is possible to exploit EIS to bypass access control. Access is 
denied or granted based on an identifier stored on an ID card and the identifier travels 
through EIS before the decision is made. The allow/deny response message travels 
through EIS as well. Manipulating either of these messages allows an attacker to control 
access to the container yard. Access to the yard could serve as an intermediary for a 
physical attack or for reconnaissance. 
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EIS has no user interface or human users so it’s not susceptible to misuse or mistakes 
made by users, but human error is still possible during configuration or software devel-
opment. Such errors might lead to unintended behavior of the system, which in most 
cases would lead to Denial of Service or degradation of performance. 
As in any system, it is possible that a device or cable physically breaks. This can happen 
purposefully with malicious intentions, accidentally, or because of age or poor quality. 
The consequences of such incidents can be similar to cyber attacks even if they weren’t 
actually attacks nor had anything to do with cyberspace. 
4.4 Threat assessment tools 
In today’s networked world, it is not possible to achieve complete cyber security, and 
therefore cyber security should be viewed as risk assessment [20]. This thesis applies 
assessment methods and tools to find points of improvement for cyber security of EIS. 
As was shown in Chapter 3, attacks targeting ICS systems are great in number, variety 
and complexity. Therefore it is absolutely necessary to have a tool capable of formaliz-
ing, phasing and visualizing the process of cyber threat assessment. Luckily, there al-
ready is a selection of tools specifically made for the purpose [22; 88]. These include 
attack trees [89], CORAS [90], EBIOS [91], INSAW [92] and OCTAVE [93]. 
Attack trees were chosen to be used in this thesis, because the concept appears to be 
already widely known in the field of process automation due to the extensive use of 
fault trees in safety analysis. The well-known concept supports communication among 
security, safety and automation professionals. In addition the relative simplicity of at-
tack trees makes them suitable for the limited time frame of this study. Attack trees have 
also been previously used in the ICS field [94]. 
Attack trees were first introduced by Schneier [89] in 1999 as a formal way to present 
attacks targeting a system. Similar tree-like structures have been used earlier in fault 
management as fault trees, but Schneier introduced them to the world of cyber security 
[95]. Attack trees deconstruct an attack into more concrete attacks or goals, thus lower-
ing the level of abstraction and making attacks easier to understand [95]. 
Construction of an attack tree begins by recognizing main goals of possible attackers. 
These are called roots. To achieve a root goal, an attacker needs to achieve one or more 
sub-goals first. These sub-goals are presented as nodes of the attack tree. If necessary, a 
sub-goal may again be divided into nodes. Nodes that can’t be further divided are called 
leaves of the tree. If nodes are combined with an AND node, all of them need to be 
completed to achieve the goal. A path all the way from a leaf node to the root is called 
an attack vector. A sample attack tree is presented in Figure 8. The attack trees present-
ed in this thesis have been drawn using a security modeling tool called SeaMonster [96]. 
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Figure 8. Example of an attack tree. 
The description of attack trees given above is similar to the one originally given by 
Schneier [89], but more formal definitions exist as well. Both Mauw & Oostdijk [95] 
and Moore et al. [97] present a more mathematical definition through graph theory, but 
for the purpose of this thesis, it is not necessary to examine those definitions any fur-
ther. 
Once the attack trees have been constructed, nodes are rated according to the difficulty 
of their execution. The rating scale used here was adapted from Byres et al. [94], but 
other similar scales could be used as well. The scale has four different levels of difficul-
ty: trivial, moderate, difficult and unlikely. The levels are described in Table 1. The 
benefit of a rating system is that once rated, different attack vectors become comparable 
with each other in terms of difficulty. In risk assessment difficulty is an important factor 
as it has a direct influence on probability. 
Table 1. Difficulty rating for attack tree nodes. Based on Byres et al. [94]. 
Level Level name Level description Capable attackers 
1 Trivial Little or no technical knowledge required Anyone 
2 Moderate 
Average skills and knowledge of cyber 
attacks 
Cyber enthusiast, criminal, 
industry competitor 
3 Difficult Significant amount of technical expertise 
Industry competitor, 
organized crime 
4 Unlikely Beyond the known capacity of hackers National level actors 
 
Root
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3
Node 4 Node 5
Leaf 2AND Leaf 3
AND
Leaf 5Leaf 4
Leaf 1
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The rating is done by estimating difficulty of each leaf node. Difficulty of other nodes is 
then derived by their sub-goals (also called children). If a node has multiple children 
that are connected through an AND node, it inherits the highest rating among the chil-
dren. If a node has children that are connected without an AND node, it inherits the 
lowest rating among the children. For example if a node has two children (with difficul-
ty ratings of 2 and 3) connected to it through an AND node, the parent node is given a 
rating of 3. If the same node also has a child node (with the rating of 1) that is not con-
nected through the AND node, then the parent node is given a rating of 1. 
Once all nodes have been rated, different attack vectors can be compared and the short-
est and easiest paths to the root nodes are found. These results are useful when design-
ing and implementing security measures or conducting risk assessment. Easiest path can 
be deemed as the most probable while more demanding paths are exclusive to more 
organized attackers. To complete the assessment, the impact of most critical paths is 
assessed on a scale of 1 to 4 (see Table 2). An attack qualifies to a certain level if it ful-
fills one or more of the level descriptors. 
Finally, the probability and impact ratings are combined in a risk matrix, where differ-
ent attack vectors are placed according to their ratings. Based on the risk matrix it is 
easier to decide which risks should be mitigated and which are acceptable. The structure 
of this method is compliant with ISO/IEC 27005 standard [98], covering the three phas-
es of risk assessment: identification, analysis and evaluation. 
Table 2. Description of different impact levels for attack vectors. 
Level Level name Level description 
1 Minimal 
No interruption of process 
No physical damage 
No personal injuries 
Little to no financial damage 
No data leakage 
2 Minor 
Interruption of process (hours) 
Physical damage 
No personal injuries 
Small financial damage 
Small leakage of non-valuable data 
3 Major 
Interruption of process (days) 
Significant physical damage 
Personal injury 
Financial damage 
Leakage/loss of valuable data 
4 Catastrophic 
Lengthy interruption of process 
Expensive physical damage 
Life-threatening personal injury 
Significant financial damage 
Extensive leakage/loss of valuable data 
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4.5 Threat assessment 
In this section, the process of forming attack trees from the security concerns of Section 
4.3 is discussed. The scoring system presented in the previous chapter is then applied to 
rate the attack vectors. In addition, three of the attack vectors are further examined to 
provide more detailed examples of attacks. 
4.5.1 Attack trees 
The attack trees turned out to be large and complicated, so, for the sake of readability 
and clarity, most of them have been divided into smaller sections. There are also certain 
sections that are present in most of the attacks, so to avoid repetition, those sections are 
presented as separate trees and then referred to in other trees. Due to the size of the 
trees, they are only provided in Appendix A: Attack trees. In the appendix, the content 
of the trees has also been explained in greater detail. 
All nodes in the attack trees have been rated using the difficulty rating of Table 1 and 
the score of each node is presented in brackets after the name the node. Like the security 
concerns in Section 4.3, the attack trees presented in this thesis are based on a single 
terminal, meaning that they represent threats to that specific terminal. While the threats 
are fairly similar in other terminals as the system itself isn’t that different, changes es-
pecially in the physical environment and hardware in use have an impact on the scoring 
of various nodes. 
In this particular case the physical access control was found to be insufficient, so the 
difficulty rating for physical attacks has been set low. Other terminals may have more 
effective control, which in turn would make physical attacks significantly more diffi-
cult. On the other hand, as the case of Antwerp suggests, physical access control might 
be a more common problem among terminals and ports in general. The misconfigured 
firewall also had an impact on the result. 
The attack trees were constructed using three main goals as root nodes: denial of ser-
vice, moving CHE and data leakage. These three goals reflect the attack motivations 
described in Section 4.2. In addition, gaining knowledge on the target system and unau-
thorized access were treated as separate trees, as they were a part of most other trees. 
4.5.2 Threat classification 
The attack trees reveal all the possible attack vectors, but presenting and scoring each 
vector separately would introduce a lot of redundancy, and thereby make the risk matrix 
difficult to read and sometimes even misleading. Therefore, attack vectors with similar 
scores have been bundled together. This allows for reduction of the number of attack 
vectors to 14. The bundled attack vectors are presented in Table 3 with their scores. 
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Table 3. Attack vector enumeration and scoring. 
Goal Attack vector 
Matrix 
ID 
Scores 
Difficulty Impact 
Denial of 
Service 
Flood devices accessible from the Internet A 1 2 
Damage to CHE and / or infrastructure B 2 3 
Remove vital system data C 2 3 
Interfere with communications D 2 2 
Shut down OS or JVM E 2 2 
Edit the container map F 2 2 
Flood network devices G 2 1 
Freeze OSGi bundles H 3 2 
Moving 
CHE 
Inject instructions to the ICS network I 2 3 
Exploit an OSGi vulnerability to modify data J 3 4 
Data 
leakage 
Steal process data K 2 3 
Capture messages between EIS and TOS or CHE CS L 2 2 
Go to the yard to see / access  the containers M 2 1 
Exploit an OSGi vulnerability to capture data N 3 3 
 
From the table it is clear to see that more than half of the attack vectors result in Denial 
of Service. These attacks are fairly easy to carry out, but also the impacts of such attacks 
remain generally lower than in other attacks. Causing a CHE to collide is an exception, 
because collisions potentially cause significant damage to the equipment and the infra-
structure, and under rare conditions even personal injuries are possible. While there are 
safety features in place to prevent such incidents, attacking those simultaneously would 
allow an attacker to achieve the objective. Although moving CHE has only two attack 
vectors associated to it, it is noteworthy that the impacts of these attacks are significant. 
Attacks resulting in data leakage have various impacts depending on the data they are 
targeting. 
Only one attack vector with a difficulty rating of one was found. This is due to the sen-
sible network design, which prevents direct access to the process server from the Inter-
net. The only exception was a misconfiguration, which allows access from the Internet. 
Also comparing to commercial off-the-shelf products, the system is rather obscure, and 
therefore finding vulnerabilities requires more understanding about the context. This 
doesn’t mean that attacks would be any more difficult for more capable attackers, it just 
implies that the system isn’t an ideal target for casual hackers, because it requires more 
examination initially. 
There are also no attack vectors with the highest difficulty rating of four. This is ex-
plained by the fact that there are many other threats with lower difficulty ratings, so it is 
easy to ignore attacks that are very difficult to carry out. Once other threats have been 
mitigated, the assessment can be revised with the focus on more complicated attacks to 
include more unlikely incidents. 
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It is also worth noting that attack vectors have been rated as separate attacks. Using at-
tack vectors in conjunction with each other might lead to a more significant impact 
without significant increase in difficulty. For example multiple DoS attacks could be 
deployed simultaneously, in which case recovery would take longer. Simpler attacks 
can also be used as a distraction to attract the attention of system operators while carry-
ing out a more sophisticated attack. 
For easy comparison attack vectors are also presented in the form of a risk matrix in 
Table 4. To see which letter corresponds to which attack vector, refer to the matrix ID 
column of Table 3. The risk matrix has been color coded so that green signifies low 
risk, yellow signifies mediocre risk and red signifies high risk. The threats on the red 
cells should be mitigated as soon as possible, whereas the threats on the green area can 
be accepted, at least while the other threats are being addressed. 
Table 4. Risk matrix of the attack vectors. 
Difficulty 
Impact 
Minimal Minor Major Catastrophic 
Trivial 
 
A 
  
Moderate G, M D, E, F, L B, C, I, K 
 
Difficult  H N J 
Unlikely 
    
 
4.5.3 Attack scenarios 
In this sub-section, three scenarios are presented based on the attack trees. The scenarios 
are hypothetical only, so they do not go into great technical detail, but they will offer 
some insight on how cyber attacks generally proceed. Some assumptions about precon-
ditions and the environment are made based on findings of this thesis. 
Scenario 1: Denial of Service 
The first scenario describes an incident, where a cyber attack is used to cause damage 
by causing a collision between a CHE and a container (see Figure 9 on page 55). The 
incident will at least render the CHE inoperable, but it is likely that the entire process is 
suspended to figure out why the collision happened. This attack vector utilizes various 
kinds of premade attack tools to make the attack easier. 
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Figure 9. An attack vector for a DoS attack 
Because the ICS network isn’t accessible directly from the Internet, the attacker must 
first gain access to the office network, which is adjacent to the ICS network. To achieve 
this, the attacker uses a network scanning tool, such as Nmap, to scan access points to 
the office network. It is assumed that the attacker is able to guess or steal login creden-
tials for a remote access service or find some other vulnerable point in the outer perime-
ter of the network. The attacker has now entered the office network. 
In order to access the ICS network, the attacker needs to find a vulnerable target in the 
ICS network and gain control of it. The difficulty of this phase depends on how the two 
networks are separated from each other. If the networks are directly connected to each 
other, finding a target is easy, but if the networks are not connected at all, the attacker 
needs to take a step back and find another way to access the ICS network. 
In this case, the networks are separated by a firewall. This means, that the attacker needs 
to either compromise the firewall, for example with malware, or try to find a way 
through the firewall. This usually isn’t that difficult, because firewalls in ICS environ-
ments tend to be configured for accessibility, not security. Here, it is assumed that the 
attacker has eventually found a network intrusion tool that penetrates the firewall and is 
now able to capture all traffic between EIS and TOS. 
By analyzing packets captured from the network, the attacker is able to figure out how 
containers are represented in the messages, how they are added and removed and how 
TOS instructs EIS to move containers. Based on this knowledge the attacker can now 
instruct EIS to remove containers from the container map. Once a container is removed 
from the container map, CHEs won’t be aware of it. If CHEs relied solely on the map, 
they would collide with anything that isn’t on the map, so the surroundings of a CHE 
are monitored by other safety features as well. In case any of these features fails, for 
example due to a software bug or another cyber attack, a collision will happen. 
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A less capable attacker can just randomly remove containers from the map and see what 
happens, but a more ambitious attacker can try to find containers that are already placed 
so that it is easy to cause a collision. It is even possible to instruct a CHE to move a con-
tainer to an optimal location, which really would be a rather trivial task as all the re-
quired information is already available at this point. It would also be possible to trigger 
the incident by instructing a CHE to park on the location of a container that has been 
removed from the map. 
Scenario 2: data leakage 
In the second scenario it is assumed that an attacker wants to steal KPI data from the 
system (see Figure 10). The attacker is aiming for long-term presence in the system to 
collect data regularly, with the intent to sell the data to an industry competitor. There-
fore the attacker modifies a piece of malware found online to fit the purpose. The piece 
of malware is designed to scan the network and look for any servers. Every time a serv-
er is found, the malware replicates itself and attempts to infect the server as well. Once a 
server is infected, the malware opens a remote control connection to receive further in-
structions from the attacker. 
First, the attacker has to somehow deliver the piece of malware to the target network. 
To accomplish this, the attacker only needs to deliver the malware to the office network, 
which is adjacent to the targeted ICS network, as the malware is clever enough to get 
through the firewall separating the networks. So, the attacker sends the malware in an 
email attachment disguised as a Microsoft Word document to various email addresses 
that were found on the terminal operator’s website and waits for the malware to start 
opening connections. 
Eventually, after infecting some other servers in the office network, the malware finds 
its way to the process server of the ICS network and opens a remote control connection 
for the attacker. Having gained access to the process server, the attacker can now try to 
install a packet sniffing tool on the process server in order to capture packets going in 
and out of the server. Optionally, the attacker can exploit a vulnerability in a switch and 
use the server just as an intermediary to deliver captured packets. 
 
Figure 10. An attack vector for data leakage 
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The attacker can’t just collect all possible packets all the time, because that would cause 
suspicious amounts of network traffic and load on the process server. Therefore it is 
necessary for the attacker to first only capture short sequences of packets to just a few 
IP addresses at the time. Once the attacker has figured out some characteristics of the 
packets containing KPI data, it is possible to start capturing the relevant packets only. 
The difficulty of this attack vector is defined by three factors. First, if the malicious 
email is not opened or an anti-virus program detects the threat, the attack fails. Second, 
a firewall between the Internet and the ICS network may deny connection attempts of 
the malware, so a well-configured firewall would make the attack challenging. Third, a 
properly protected process server would make it significantly more difficult to both in-
fect the server and to perform any further operations on it. In this case though, the pro-
cess server is not regularly updated, so it is likely that the malware would be able to 
infect it. 
Scenario 3: moving Container Handling Equipment 
The third scenario describes an attack, where a container is moved by gaining control of 
a CHE (see Figure 11). As was discussed before, this type of attack would most likely 
be useful when stealing a container from the terminal. It is safe to assume that the at-
tacker would already be in close proximity of the terminal, so this attack vector includes 
a physical component as well. 
The purpose is to physically trespass into the premises of the terminal and install a ma-
licious device that can capture and inject packets in the ICS network. The malicious 
device communicates with the attacker’s laptop via a wireless connection of its own, so 
it is neither dependent on an Internet connection, nor affected by any firewalls or other 
security systems protecting the terminal operator’s networks. The device could use for 
example Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, but if a larger range is required, the device could just as 
well have its own SIM card and phone number to facilitate communication over the 
telephone network. 
Having built the malicious device, the attacker needs to access the terminal in order to 
install it. The attacker could for example pretend to be a Kalmar employee and ask for 
access to the building where the process server is located. Of course the attacker won’t 
know beforehand where the malicious device should be plugged into, so it might be 
necessary to first do some network scanning disguised as maintenance operations. On 
the other hand it would also be possible to use methods from previous scenarios to re-
motely scan the network in advance. Nonetheless, it is assumed that the attacker is able 
find a suitable location for the malicious device to be installed. 
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Figure 11. An attack vector for moving Container Handling Equipment 
Next, the attacker will need to find out how the system operates. Analyzing packets cap-
tured from the network should offer enough information for the attacker to understand 
what is needed to form a container move request. Most importantly the attacker needs to 
acquire the ID of the container to be moved. The ID binds together an actual container 
and its digital representation. The ID can be obtained by observing messages that in-
clude data about containers. Those messages have the ID, but also another identification 
number that is also visible on the actual container and therefore known to the attacker as 
well. So finding a message with matching identification number from the actual con-
tainer, the attacker is able to obtain the ID that the system uses to distinguish containers. 
Once the container ID has been found, the attacker needs to craft a container move re-
quest, which at its simplest only includes the ID and coordinates of the target location. 
Based on that information the system finds out the current location of the container and 
schedules an appropriate CHE to carry out the move. 
4.6 Countermeasures 
In this section, suggestions are made on how to improve cyber security of Kalmar’s 
container handling automation system in general (Sub-section 4.6.1) and cyber security 
of EIS in specific (Sub-section 4.6.2). General suggestions are made based on ICS-
specific literature and good practices, and as such they are applicable in other ICS sys-
tems as well. EIS-specific suggestions have mostly been applied from more specific 
literature, which means that their application in other environments may not be straight-
forward. 
When trying to achieve comprehensive cyber security that covers the entire ICS net-
work, no single security solution is adequate, so individual solutions need to be applied 
to complement each other [20; 29]. As was discussed in Section 4.3, a defense-in-depth 
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approach is often recommended, and it will also be applied here. Depth of defense can 
be perceived on two different levels [20]. On one hand, the network itself can be divid-
ed in security zones to provide a layered structure. On the other hand, technical solu-
tions, processes, training, policies and other measures can be viewed as layers, creating 
depth to the defense. 
In the early days of cyber security, it was thought that not telling anyone how a system 
or a program works would provide sufficient security against hackers and other attack-
ers. This kind of security-by-obscurity principle has been proven to be inefficient 
against modern attacks, such as reverse engineering. Therefore building security on the 
assumption that secrets will always remain as secrets is not recommended. For example 
writing passwords directly into software code (known as hardcoding) isn’t recommend-
ed, as it won’t be possible to change these passwords later if they get compromised by 
an attacker. 
The limited space and timeframe of this thesis does not allow for an extensive look on 
countermeasures. Therefore it is advised to refer to the IEC standard 62443-3-1 [5], the 
cyber security guide by the French network and security agency (ANSSI) [99] and 
NIST SP 800-82 [29] for more detailed and comprehensive coverage. Additionally, ref-
erences used in this chapter usually provide additional information.  
4.6.1 System-wide countermeasures 
Only countermeasures that provide direct or indirect benefits to the security of EIS have 
been covered in this section. While the system-wide measures may not protect EIS as 
such, they limit the amount of attack vectors that may lead to exploitation of EIS, and 
therefore have been included in this section. Choosing a focal point other than EIS 
would presumably result in a different set of countermeasures, and therefore the set of 
measures presented here can’t be considered exhaustive when considering an entire ICS 
system. Still, implementing the measures presented here would be a considerable im-
provement and would result in an adequate baseline of security. 
Secure network architecture 
Practically all sources that discuss the architecture of ICS networks suggest some form 
of separation between the ICS network and other networks. As today’s ICS networks 
most of the time require connections to other networks, it is not possible to isolate them 
completely. It is recommended though that the number of entry points to the ICS net-
work is kept to its minimum [20; 29]. Ideally, all connections would pass through a sin-
gle strictly controlled entry point [19; 29]. Limiting the amount of entry points decreas-
es the size of attack landscape for the attacker, but also makes the network more man-
ageable, as there are fewer devices that need to be configured. Entry points are usually 
protected with a firewall or a similar filtering solution [20]. According to Stouffer et al. 
60 
[29], network segregation and segmentation is among the most effective architectural 
concepts of ICS security. 
To further strengthen the segregation between the ICS network and other networks, a 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) can be added between the networks [20; 100]. The purpose 
of a DMZ is to act as a buffer between the networks and eliminate all direct connections 
between them [100]. When using a DMZ, instead of having direct connections between 
devices from different networks, requests are made to the DMZ server, which then 
completes the requests [29; 100]. This way the two devices never actually communicate 
with each other, but only with the DMZ server. To filter out any malicious requests, the 
DMZ server can be configured to only allow through certain types of messages from 
certain IP addresses. 
A DMZ is particularly useful when networks managed by different entities need to be 
interconnected. This is the case for example in maritime terminals, where typically the 
ICS network is owned by the system provider and the office network is owned by the 
terminal operator. As the container handling process relies on certain inputs from the 
Terminal Operating System, a connection between these networks is necessary. 
The ICS network itself should also be divided into logical segments. Firewalls can be 
used to control communication between the network segments. For example treating the 
wireless part of a network as an individual segment and separating it from the wired part 
with a firewall would mitigate the risk of an attacker exploiting a vulnerability in a 
wireless device to attack a server in the wired part of the network. 
In large networks, segments can consist of even smaller sub-segments that can be fur-
ther divided, but ultimately they consist of individual devices that can be secured with 
various host-based security solutions, such as host-based firewalls, anti-malware soft-
ware and Host Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) [19]. The most suitable solution 
depends on the device and should always be chosen case-specifically. VLANs can also 
be applied to keep traffic of one segment invisible to other segments [20], as has been 
done on Kalmar’s solution. 
Principally, connecting an ICS network to the Internet should be avoided, but if for any 
reason the ICS network needs to be accessed from the Internet, the connection should be 
authenticated and encrypted. To achieve this, most often a Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) solution is used [29]. On the case example of this thesis, access was only al-
lowed from the Kalmar Intranet using VPN. This solution adds an additional layer of 
security as exploitation would require accessing the Intranet first. Unfortunately, the 
solution was rendered useless by the misconfigured firewall that, when exploited, would 
allow access past the VPN. Security could be improved by configuring the firewall so 
that it is visible to only certain IP addresses. Moving the VPN endpoint from the ICS 
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network to a DMZ would give better control over communication made over the VPN 
connection, thus providing further improvement in security. 
Security monitoring 
One important aspect of maintaining a secure state in a system is monitoring. Security 
monitoring tools are usually referred to as Security Information and Event Management 
(SIEM) tools. Two examples of SIEM tools are Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and 
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS). Both of these systems analyze network packets to 
find signs of malicious actions, such as malware or exploits [19]. While IDS systems 
are only able to detect intrusions and generate alerts, IPS systems can also take actions 
to stop suspected attacks by dropping the malicious packets. 
According to Knapp [19], IDS and IPS can both be installed in-line or out-of-line with 
other network devices. When installed in-line, the IDS or IPS stops each packet, in-
spects it and then lets it go. As a consequence, some delay is introduced. Installing ei-
ther system out-of-line allows analysis without causing any delay as the packets are 
mirrored (duplicated) before inspection. As a downside, out-of-line systems can’t drop 
any malicious packets they identify. This means that IPS systems can only utilize their 
full potential when installed in-line, while IDS systems do not benefit from in-line in-
stallation, so in time-critical systems they should be installed out-of-line to avoid delay. 
IDS and IPS systems are best used in conjunction with a firewall, as it is able to filter 
packets based on their type, whereas IDS and IPS systems analyze the content of pack-
ets to allow or deny traffic [19; 20]. Using a firewall as a filter before an IDS or IPS 
also reduces the amount of traffic left for analysis, effectively reducing delay. IDS and 
IPS systems can be deployed either at the outer perimeter of the network to monitor 
traffic going in and out of the network, or at an individual device to monitor traffic in 
and out of the device [20]. 
IDS and IPS systems are based on a set of rules that define what kind of traffic is nor-
mal in the network, while everything else is considered malicious. As ICS networks 
usually are fairly static and the network traffic is limited to a small and strictly defined 
set of protocols, they are relatively easy in terms of configuring rulesets. Therefore, IDS 
and IPS systems are well suited for monitoring and securing ICS networks. 
Authentication and encryption 
Authentication has already been brought up on multiple occasions in this thesis, which 
highlights its significance to cyber security. Authentication provides the means to verify 
the identity of users and devices based on the credentials they provide [29]. Both human 
users and devices should always be authenticated to verify the claimed identity before 
any other communication takes place. 
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There are two general approaches to authentication: distributed and centralized [29]. 
Distributed authentication means that each system is responsible for its own authentica-
tion. Each system also stores its own user accounts and credentials, which means that 
users have separate accounts for each system. When authentication is centralized, all 
systems use the same authentication service and accounts and credentials are stored by 
that centralized service only. 
The advantage of distributed authentication is that it doesn’t require any additional in-
frastructure, but in large networks maintenance becomes tedious as accounts need to be 
created and removed separately in each system [29]. If a centralized authentication ser-
vice is used, its security and constant availability must be guaranteed. Stouffer et al. 
[29] also note that some older products that are still used in ICS systems may not have 
any support for centralized authentication. 
Regardless of the authentication approach, the credentials should be strong. As has been 
noted earlier, this was not the case in the assessed system. If passwords are used, they 
should be complex and be only used once. Default passwords should be changed. Using 
the same authentication credentials on multiple systems or devices is not recommended, 
unless a centralized authentication system is in use. 
There are also other authentication methods that can be used instead of or in conjunction 
with passwords. In challenge/response authentication both entities have agreed upon a 
secret code beforehand. Authentication happens by one entity sending a random se-
quence (the challenge) and the other entity using the secret code to generate a unique 
sequence from the challenge (the response). Biometric authentication uses a unique bio-
logical characteristic, such as a fingerprint or facial geometry, as the credential to identi-
fy the human requesting access. A physical token, such as a smart card or a Radio Fre-
quency Identification (RFID) tag, can also be used to store the password, meaning that 
it can be longer and more complex. 
While authentication ensures that the endpoints are who they claim to be, encryption 
protects network traffic from being read or altered between endpoints. Encryption adds 
additional phases to sending and receiving packets, which means that latency of the 
network traffic is increased. The amount of latency added depends on multiple varia-
bles, including the encryption algorithm used and available processing resources, which 
means that the impact of individual solutions may vary. Being typically time-critical, 
ICS systems are susceptible to latency, and therefore encryption isn’t always possible 
[29]. 
Considering EIS, most of its communication happens with other components running on 
the same process server, so encryption doesn’t provide significant improvement there, 
as the data only travels short distances. EIS also handles connections that are time-
critical, so applying encryption there would be problematic due to the introduced laten-
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cy. Finally, EIS is connected to the Terminal Operating System and possibly to other 
third party systems that are located outside the ICS network. These connections usually 
can endure more latency, and as the endpoints are located in different networks, encryp-
tion, in conjunction with authentication, would provide an improvement in security. 
However, the most significant gains from encryption would be achieved in wireless 
networks and when accessing the network remotely from the Internet. 
Change and configuration management 
Over time, as configuration changes and system updates are made, the system slowly 
transforms. Changes are usually made to improve some aspect of the system, but if they 
are not traced and documented, the state of the system will slowly become unknown. 
Stouffer et al. [29] recommend the establishment of a formal change management pro-
gram. Guidance can be found for example in NIST SP 800-100 [101] and NIST SP 800-
128 [102]. 
As was pointed out in Section 3.5 and in Sub-section 4.3.1, patch management of an 
ICS network is a complicated task due to the conflict between security and availability 
of the system. Arguments can be made both for and against applying patches. It can be 
argued that updates shouldn’t be made, because they introduce change to the ICS envi-
ronment and therefore slowly erode the system, eventually causing it to malfunction. 
There is also the risk of something going wrong when applying a patch. On the other 
hand, leaving the system unpatched increases the attack landscape as time passes. For 
example, if a system has been unpatched for two years, the system is susceptible to all 
vulnerabilities discovered in that time. 
From the security perspective application of critical patches is absolutely necessary. To 
mitigate the risk of unwanted process interruptions, a systematic approach to patch 
management is recommended [29]. The German federal energy association (Bun-
desverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft e.V., BDEV) [103] suggests five re-
quirements for patch management in critical infrastructures: 
1. The system shall allow patching of all components. 
2. Patching should be possible without interrupting normal operation. 
3. Preferentially, patches are installed on passive and redundant components first. 
Other components are updated after the switch-over process. 
4. The system provider shall support a patch management process that manages 
testing, installation and documentation of patches. It is recommended that the 
staff operating the system installs the patches. 
5. Installation and uninstallation of patches shall always be authorized by the sys-
tem owner and must not be done automatically. 
From the first three requirements it can be concluded that patch application needs to be 
considered already when designing the system. The first requirement suggests that all 
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components must be somehow accessible, so that they can be updated. The second and 
third requirements suggest that critical components of the system must be redundant, so 
that they can be updated without any interruptions to the operation. Fourth and fifth 
requirements suggest that there should be a patch management policy in place to ensure 
consistency of patch management. 
To make sure updates do not break any functionality of the system, updates should be 
tested before they are applied to the production environment. Terminal operators typi-
cally have their own testing environments to test software and hardware, so regular test-
ing of updates wouldn’t be too difficult to facilitate. Installing patches usually requires a 
pause in the operation, but the OSGi framework used in EIS allows bundles being 
swapped without interruptions, which makes updating EIS easier. 
To support controlled management, a patch management system can be used. A patch 
management system distributes patches to appropriate devices and monitors that all de-
vices stay up-to-date [104]. Some systems are capable of regularly scanning for new 
updates and automatically distributing them to the devices, but using such features is 
not recommended in ICS systems, where patches need to be verified and tested before 
installation [104]. 
In ICS systems the benefit of using a patch management system is that devices do not 
need to be updated individually by hand. The system can also be used to ensure that all 
devices are running the correct software versions and to detect new devices with false 
software versions being added to the network. If the patch management system doesn’t 
require any connections to the outside, it can be located in the ICS network, but it is 
recommended to place it in the DMZ, if there is one [29]. 
To improve reliability, the automation system of Kalmar has already been specified to 
be duplicated to a second process server [105]. This means that if the primary server 
fails for any reason, a manual switch-over can be performed to start running the process 
on the secondary server. If this redundant two-server structure was upgraded to a mir-
rored system with an automatic switch-over, it could also be utilized to update all soft-
ware on the servers without interruptions to the automation process. This would be 
achieved by updating the secondary server first, then performing a switch-over and fi-
nally updating the primary server as well. Naturally, it would be necessary to test the 
patches first in a test environment to make sure that they don’t change the automation 
process in any way. Otherwise the switch-over may not be successful. 
Hardening 
To reduce the size of the attack landscape, the software and devices should be hardened. 
Hardening means disabling or removing features, services or software that are not nec-
essary for the intended operation of the system [20]. For example operating systems and 
firewalls used in ICS networks are generally made for a wide range of applications, so 
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they have plenty of functions that are not useful in a terminal automation system. These 
functions may have vulnerabilities or be exploited in attacks, so they should be disabled 
or, when possible, removed. Almost any part of a system can be hardened, but work-
stations, servers and networking devices are examples of the most typical items [20]. 
The general idea in hardening is to remove everything that isn’t necessary, which is 
where the difficulty lies as well. To be able to harden an object properly, one must 
know exactly what is necessary and what isn’t. Detailed documentation of the object is 
helpful, but over time the object might change making the hardened configuration either 
too tight or too loose. A too loose configuration means that unnecessary actions are al-
lowed, giving more possibilities for attackers. On the other hand a too tight configura-
tion blocks actions that are needed for normal operation. To help harden their products, 
major network device and OS manufacturers produce hardening guides with instruc-
tions on what to configure and how to do it. 
Secure execution environment 
Even when the ICS network and its connections have been carefully designed and all 
devices have been appropriately secured, it might happen that a malicious program finds 
its way on a PC or on the process server. To keep the most valuable data secure from 
the malicious program, a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) can be established. A 
TEE is a secure processing environment that is isolated from the rest of the environ-
ment, sometimes called the Rich Execution Environment (REE) [106]. Isolation means 
that even if the malicious program infects the REE, it won’t be able to access the TEE. 
Integrity of the TEE is verified when the system starts, and only authorized applications 
are allowed to access the environment to make sure that integrity is maintained [106]. 
Secure execution environments have been applied to different technologies where integ-
rity of the system is important, such as smart cards [106], mobile phones [106] and 
cloud environments [107]. Development in smart cards and mobile devices suggests 
that secure execution environments could be applied in the mobile parts of the container 
handling process, i.e. in the CHEs. Weiqi et al. [107] present a method to create a TEE 
in a cloud computing environment that uses virtualization. The problem of ensuring 
isolation between virtual machines was also identified on the process server of Kalmar’s 
container handling automation system, and use of TEE would provide a more reliable 
isolation there as well. 
While some secure execution technologies already exist as complete products, not much 
research has been done on applying them in ICS environments. Secure execution envi-
ronments seem to have the potential to produce an improvement in ICS security, but 
only when other parts of the network are equally secure. Securing the endpoints with 
TEEs won’t offer a significant improvement in security if the communication channels 
are left insecure and susceptible to Man-in-the-Middle attacks. 
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Incident recovery 
Even if all the recommended security measures are in place, the scenario of a security 
breach should still be considered. It is vital that employees know how to act in the event 
of a security incident in order to mitigate the consequences. An incident response plan 
is a document that describes at least responsibilities, predefined procedures, tools avail-
able and a communication plan for security incidents [108]. A specific Process Control 
Security Response Team (PCSRT) can also be assigned to manage response to security 
alerts and incidents [108]. 
In some cases incidents lead to loss of data and therefore backups should be made of all 
valuable data regularly to mitigate the risk. Such data also includes metadata, for exam-
ple how devices are configured and what software versions are currently installed. Well-
organized and easily recoverable backups also quicken recovery from the incident. 
Documenting the network structure and configurations used in devices makes incident 
recovery easier when broken devices or components need to be replaced. The general 
purpose of incident recovery plan is to re-establish the normal operation of the system 
as quickly and safely as possible [29]. 
Physical access control 
The main concern regarding physical access in this case was someone with malicious 
intentions accessing the site and altering or damaging network devices or the process 
server. To mitigate this threat, access to the site should be more strictly controlled. Se-
curity-critical spaces should be identified and access to those spaces should be allowed 
for authorized personnel only [29]. Access control can be enforced using keys, Personal 
Identification Numbers (PIN), access cards or any other authentication methods dis-
cussed earlier. Access to servers and network cabinets should also be limited to mainte-
nance personnel only [29]. 
Physical access control is typically the responsibility of the terminal operator, which 
makes management of this aspect of cyber security more difficult to manage. If the sys-
tem provider wants to ensure security of its system, a contract between the provider and 
the operator must define the minimum level of physical access control. 
Policies, contracts and training 
Policies are an important part of establishing a desired level of cyber security [109]. 
Security policies define an organization’s approach to managing both information secu-
rity and cyber security [110]. They also determine responsibilities, such as who is re-
sponsible for the security of the ICS network [111]. Organizations usually already have 
policies regarding IT security, and ICS security policies should be integrated with them 
where possible [29]. It should be noted though that not all organization-wide policies 
are directly applicable in ICS environments, so ICS-specific policies are required [20]. 
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Kilman & Stamp [109] introduce a framework that presents a hierarchical classification 
of security policies, which covers different aspects of ICS security and what security 
policies should be created to cover those aspects. The authors use the term SCADA, but 
their definition of SCADA is actually closer to the definition of ICS as it was defined in 
this thesis. A redrawn version of the framework, where the term SCADA has been re-
placed with ICS to avoid confusion, is presented in Figure 12. 
At the highest level of the framework is the system security program, which defines the 
context for all the other policies. It provides information about the ICS environment, but 
rarely contains any policy statements [109]. The different policies are divided into nine 
groups that represent different viewpoints. The reasoning behind this division is that 
multiple entities can work on different policies simultaneously with as little overlap as 
possible [109]. For more information on the categories and the policies included in 
them, refer to the report of Kilman & Stamp [109]. 
 
Figure 12. ICS system security program framework. Adapted from Kilman & Stamp 
[109]. 
While the framework may not be suitable for every organization’s needs as such, it can 
be used as a reference to ensure that all aspects of ICS security have been considered. In 
some environments not all of the policies may be relevant, in which case they can be 
omitted. To complement the policies, procedures and guidelines can be used. Proce-
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dures are detailed sequences of steps that need to be taken in order to provide a certain 
security measure [111]. Guidelines are suggestions on how to get something done [111]. 
The main difference between guidelines and procedures is that guidelines are not meant 
to be mandatory. 
While policies define the internal conventions of an organization, in some cases it is 
necessary to establish similar rules with external entities as well. For example a con-
tainer terminal typically has at least two actors: the system provider and the terminal 
operator. To create a secure environment, these actors must cooperate and divide re-
sponsibilities between each other. To make such agreements binding, they should be 
included in contracts or Service-Level Agreements (SLA). 
It is particularly important to agree on which actor is responsible for which aspect of 
cyber security, in order to avoid confusion, overlap or gaps in security. Sanctions should 
also be set in the case that one of the actors neglects its responsibilities. From the sys-
tem provider’s viewpoint one option is to deny all responsibility. While this may seem 
intriguing at first, there are two problems in this approach. First, the system provider 
may have a legal obligation to bear some of the responsibility. Second, as customers 
become more security-aware, they will start demanding for a more security-minded ap-
proach. 
Instead of denying all responsibility, it is recommended for a system provider to have 
premade contract templates that cover different levels of security and defined require-
ments on how to achieve these levels. The increasing security-awareness of customers 
should be viewed as a new business opportunity as security features can be sold as addi-
tional products or services. Security embedded in the software and system design can 
also be used as selling points in marketing. 
For the customer it might be difficult to address cyber security in contract negotiations, 
if the organization doesn’t possess the required security knowledge. To help in such 
situations, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has produced a procurement lan-
guage for cyber security in ICS systems [112]. This document offers insight on what 
should be considered when procuring an ICS system and how to formally express these 
requirements in a contract or in an SLA. The document is equally useful for system 
providers, as it can be used as reference when designing security features. 
Implementation of a security program typically requires changes on how employees 
carry out their daily tasks [29]. To ensure that the employees understand why such 
changes are made and actually obey the new policies, security awareness must be raised 
and skills need to be developed. To achieve this, a NIST Special Publication [113] sug-
gests the use of an awareness and training program, including four phases: 
1. Awareness and training program design. 
2. Awareness and training program material development. 
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3. Program implementation. 
4. Post-implementation. 
According to the Special Publication [113], in the program design phase the awareness 
and training needs are identified and an awareness and training plan is designed accord-
ingly. Then, in the second phase, awareness and training material is produced to reflect 
the needs identified in the first phase. The third phase is where the actual awareness 
raising and training takes place. In the fourth phase success of the program is monitored 
and feedback is collected to improve the program. The Special Publication [113] re-
marks that even a small awareness campaign can make a big difference in the security 
posture of an organization. 
Stouffer et al. [29] note that in an ICS environment a general IT awareness and training 
program is not adequate. Training must cover ICS-specific applications and the physical 
process controlled by the control system [29]. Training programs also demonstrate 
management’s commitment to the security program [29]. 
4.6.2 EIS-specific countermeasures 
Above, basic security fundamentals concerning IACS systems have been covered. In 
this sub-section security measures that are specific to EIS and the process server are 
discussed. Different building blocks of the system have been considered separately and 
concrete suggestions on improvement are given.  
OSGi 
In Sub-section 4.3.1, it was concluded that malicious bundles are the main concern of 
OSGi security. To control installation and resource usage of bundles, the OSGi frame-
work has a security layer [74]. The security layer, use of which is optional, offers two 
security features: code authentication and permission control. Code authentication is 
achieved by signing the bundles (technically JAR-files) with a digital signature [74]. 
When only bundles signed by authorized entities are allowed to be executed in the 
OSGi environment, malicious bundles created by hackers are blocked. In the example 
case of this thesis all the bundles would be signed by Kalmar and all unsigned bundles 
or bundles signed by other entities would be blocked. 
In addition to verifying the origin of the bundle, a digital signature also ensures integrity 
of the bundle [74]. This means that if the bundle has been modified after it has been 
signed (maliciously or due to an error), the signature check will fail and the bundle 
won’t be executed. The signature is checked only when the bundle is started, so imple-
menting digital signatures won’t affect the runtime performance of the system. The 
signing process has been described in the OSGi specification [74]. 
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While bundle authentication happens before bundles are started, permission control 
happens during execution. Permissions define what resources a bundle is allowed to 
access and what operations it can perform [74]. As with permissions in general, it is 
advised to limit the amount of permissions to its minimum. This way, even if a mali-
cious bundle does get installed, it only has a limited access to resources. 
In recent years, the Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud computing seem to have created a 
push on developing methods for reliable isolation of applications in virtualization envi-
ronments, and various solutions have been suggested [79; 114; 115]. Similar concept 
could be applied to OSGi in order to prevent malicious bundles from interfering with 
legitimate bundles, but it seems that solutions directly applicable to ICS systems are not 
yet available. 
Virtualization 
There isn’t much that can be done to improve the security of JVM apart from improving 
security of OSGi, which minimizes the possibility of a malicious actor escaping the 
JVM virtualization sandbox. Improving JVM security isn’t necessarily needed either: if 
the OSGi environment inside the JVM has been secured and vSphere is able keep the 
JVM instances separated, it shouldn’t be possible to find any exploits. 
The vSphere platform makes several attempts to ensure security of the environment on 
virtualization layer, on individual virtual machines and on virtual networking layer 
[116]. These security features cover secure processing and storage of data inside a VM, 
secure internal communication between VMs and secure external communication in and 
out of the process server. 
As vSphere in itself is a relatively large and complex system, it has its own security 
vulnerabilities and exploits [83]. The best way to cope with its vulnerabilities is to keep 
the software up-to-date and to harden the vSphere configuration. The vSphere platform 
has been designed to support a wide variety of use cases, so in most cases some unnec-
essary features need to be disabled. To achieve this and other security improvements, 
VMware has produced several documents [116-118] that offer hardening guidelines. 
ActiveMQ 
As was discussed in Sub-section 4.3.1, ActiveMQ offers the option of authenticating 
JMS clients. Authentication prevents attacks where an attacker sets up a new client to 
access message queues and topics of ActiveMQ. As Kalra [81] notes, implementing 
authentication is fairly simple, as the authentication schemes are plug-in based and re-
quire hardly any changes to the JMS client code. 
ActiveMQ supports three authentication schemes: default, simple and JAAS-based [81]. 
The default authentication actually means no authentication at all. Connections from 
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any JMS client are accepted without any username and password, granting full access 
for anyone within the network. When using simple authentication, ActiveMQ doesn’t 
accept connections without a username and a password. Kalra [81] claims that 
usernames and passwords for simple authentication are written to the configuration file 
as plaintext, but since the version 5.4.1 of ActiveMQ it is now possible to encrypt pass-
words [119]. The authorization credentials are still stored in the ActiveMQ configura-
tion file, so maintenance of the user base requires accessing the configuration file. 
The third scheme is based on Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS). 
The JAAS plug-in allows implementation of custom authentication methods [81], which 
in practice would mean leveraging Active Directory (AD), Lightweight Directory Ac-
cess Protocol (LDAP) or some other database dedicated to authentication. The benefit 
of using this scheme is that it frees ActiveMQ from the responsibility of managing au-
thentication and allows for centralized management of authentication credentials direct-
ly from the authentication system. Usually an authentication database is already present 
for other purposes, so implementing JAAS-based authentication would only be the mat-
ter of writing the plug-in and adjusting the JMS clients to support the feature. 
Without authorization all authenticated users have unlimited access to all resources, 
when clients should only have access to resources that they actually need. ActiveMQ 
offers authorization on destination level and on message level. Destination level author-
ization requires clients to have certain privileges in order to access a topic or a queue, 
whereas message level authorization controls access to individual messages in a queue 
or a topic [81]. Message level authorization provides fine-grained access control, but if 
it isn’t actually necessary, the simpler destination level authorization is recommended, 
as it is easier to configure and maintain. 
It is also possible to encrypt all messages by using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryp-
tion protocol that is natively supported by ActiveMQ [120]. When using SSL, both end-
points are first authenticated with digital certificates and from then on all communica-
tion is encrypted to protect it from Man-in-the-Middle attacks. As was already discussed 
in the previous sub-section, EIS would mainly benefit from encrypting communication 
with TOS or other third party systems that reside in other networks. The downside of 
SSL is the same as it is with all other encryption protocols: establishing a secure con-
nection takes more time and generates more network traffic. If the performance and 
stability of the system are not diminished by the use of SSL, improvement in security 
can be gained. 
Operating System 
The OS lies beneath all other software, so vulnerabilities in the OS threaten integrity of 
the entire system and it is therefore important to keep the OS updated with latest securi-
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ty patches. Hardening and controlled change management, as they were described in 
Sub-Section 4.6.1, are important in OS security. 
Security of OS can also be improved by using an Anti-Virus (AV) software. Ideally, 
virus definitions of the AV should be updated at least daily [29; 121]. The reason for the 
short update interval is the way an AV works: it compares files in the system with the 
database of virus definitions, also called signatures [121]. AV vendors constantly pro-
duce new signatures as they discover new malware. If the AV hasn’t been updated with 
these latest signatures, it won’t be able to detect the latest threats either [121]. In this 
case there already is an AV product in place, but according to documentation is not up-
dated regularly. If it is not possible to update the AV signatures during production, up-
dates should be scheduled to be performed during breaks. 
Software design 
In this chapter, the defense-in-depth approach has been applied on the outer perimeter of 
the ICS network, inside the ICS network, on the process server and other devices, on the 
processor level of the process server and on the software framework level. This is about 
as far as it is possible to go without considering security of the source code of the soft-
ware itself. Therefore, the final countermeasure covered in this thesis is secure pro-
gramming and how to avoid writing vulnerable code in the first place. 
In an effort to improve the quality of Java code and to limit vulnerabilities, various enti-
ties have created guidelines or sets of rules that help programmers to avoid common 
mistakes or oversights. While McGraw & Felten [122] listed 12 rules to develop more 
secure code, Long et al. [123] took a more comprehensive approach giving 75 recom-
mendations. Oracle [124] also has its own guidelines that are based on eight fundamen-
tals: 
1. Prefer to have obviously no flaws than no obvious flaws. 
2. Design Application Programming Interfaces (API) to avoid security concerns. 
3. Avoid duplication of code and data. 
4. Restrict privileges. 
5. Establish trust boundaries. 
6. Minimize the number of permission checks. 
7. Encapsulate. 
8. Document security-related information. 
In the scope of this thesis it is not possible to present all the guidelines and their justifi-
cations, but the guides of McGraw & Felten and Oracle are publicly available, while the 
book of Long et al. is available for purchase (see References). 
To help programmers to verify the security of their code, it is possible to conduct code 
reviews, where a professional reviews the code to identify any flaws. This of course is a 
time consuming and expensive task, so there are also automated tools that attempt to do 
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the same. As the studies of Ware & Fox [84] and Díaz & Bermejo [125] show, current 
static analysis tools aren’t perfect, but they are capable of identifying vulnerabilities. 
While Ware & Fox [84] studied eight tools using specialized test cases written in Java, 
Díaz & Bermejo [125] present a similar test, but using nine tools and C programming 
language. Most of the tools tested by Díaz & Bermejo are also capable of analyzing 
Java code. The results of both studies are similar: Static analysis tools are capable of 
identifying vulnerabilities, but only to a certain extent. They aren’t yet sophisticated 
enough to replace manual code review, but they can certainly be used in conjunction 
with it. Both studies also note that the detection rate can be improved slightly by using 
more than one tool simultaneously, as the tools identify different sets of flaws. 
As concluded by the studies, manual code review can’t be replaced by static analysis 
tools, so secure programming knowledge is needed. This can be acquired either by us-
ing external consultation or by training of employees. There are various secure pro-
grammer certificates, such as GIAC Secure Software Programmer (GSSP) [126], EC-
Council Certified Secure Programmer (ECSP) [127] and Certified Professional for Se-
cure Software Engineering (CPSSE) [128]. GSSP and ECSP both have Java-specific 
versions, whereas CPSSE takes a general approach without focusing on a single pro-
gramming language. All these certification programs aim at training programmers to 
understand how secure code is made and how vulnerabilities and flaws are identified. 
4.7 Summary 
In this section the results found in Chapters 3 and 4 are summarized. The research prob-
lems considered in this thesis were as follows: 
1. What kind of cyber threats exist in terminal automation systems? 
2. What kind of cyber threats does the External Interface Service face? 
a. What can be achieved by attacking EIS? 
b. How can EIS be compromised? 
c. How can cyber security of EIS be improved? 
To answer the first research problem, 10 different categories of threats were identified. 
They represent the attack landscape a typical terminal automation system faces. Some 
of the threats are similar to office networks, but there are also threats that are specific to 
ICS systems and terminal automation. While the attack methods themselves are mostly 
similar to the ones used in anywhere else, the consequences are usually unique to the 
terminal automation environment. Especially physical consequences are characteristic 
to terminal automation. The threat categories are summarized in Figure 13 on page 74. 
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Figure 13. Threat landscape of a terminal automation system. 
To find an answer to the second research problem, attack trees were constructed. In or-
der to find the roots of those trees, it was necessary to recognize motivations for attacks 
by analyzing the environment and the process itself. Four motivations for attacks were 
identified: 
1. interruption of process, 
2. stealing process-related data, 
3. stealing a container, 
4. moving a container through the terminal undetected. 
These four motivations also reveal what can be achieved by attacking EIS, as it was 
verified that EIS offers attack vectors for all of these motivations. The motivations rec-
ognized in this study are supported by a previous study by CyberKeel [38], where simi-
lar motivations were identified. 
Once the motivations had been found, attack trees were constructed to explore how EIS 
can be compromised. The four attack motivations were mapped to three root goals for 
attack trees: 
1. Denial of Service (DoS), 
2. data leakage, 
3. moving Container Handling Equipment (CHE). 
While the motivations 1, 2 and 3 are directly mapped to root goals 1, 2 and 3, the moti-
vation 4 is mapped to the root goal 3 as well. Moving a container through the terminal 
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undetected requires a far more complicated attack that the other motivations and it is not 
possible to carry that out by exploiting EIS only. In such attack EIS would be used to 
move containers on the container yard, so from the viewpoint of EIS the root goal 
would be the same as when stealing a container. 
Once the root goals had been established, the attack trees were constructed by analyzing 
vulnerabilities of the system to reveal all possible attack vectors. The number of differ-
ent attack vectors was very high, so some reduction was necessary. The attack vectors 
were grouped into 14 vectors that have clearly distinctive characteristics. The attack 
vectors were rated based on their difficulty and expected impact, and based on the rating 
the vectors were divided into three risk categories (see Table 5). 
Table 5 shows that there are six of both high-risk and mediocre-risk attack vectors, 
whereas the number of low-risk attack vectors is only three. This suggests that there is 
room for improvement in cyber security of the system. In particular, three problem areas 
were identified: susceptibility to Denial-of-Service attacks, accessibility of human-
readable communication and vulnerability of OSGi bundles. 
In order to improve cyber security of EIS, different cyber security technologies, meth-
ods and principles were explored and their applicability to an IACS environment was 
considered. Table 6 summarizes the measures that were found to be suitable, how they 
improve security and which attack vectors they mitigate. As the number of attack vec-
tors turned out to be high, it was necessary to find measures that mitigate as many at-
tacks as possible, since it simply isn’t feasible to mitigate the threats one by one. 
Table 5. Prioritization of attack vectors for mitigation. 
Attack vector ID Level of risk 
Exploit an OSGi vulnerability to modify data J 
High risk 
Damage to CHE and / or infrastructure B 
Remove vital system data C 
Inject instructions to the ICS network I 
Steal process data K 
Exploit an OSGi vulnerability to capture data N 
Mediocre risk 
Flood devices accessible from the Internet A 
Interfere with communications D 
Shut down OS or JVM E 
Edit the container map F 
Capture messages between EIS and TOS or CHE CS L 
Freeze OSGi bundles H 
Low risk Flood network devices G 
Go to the yard to see / access the containers M 
 
In practice that means making changes to the fundamentals of how the system is de-
signed, implemented and maintained, as opposed to retrofitting technical solutions into 
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the existing system design. Some of the countermeasures mitigate the risk associated to 
all of the attack vectors and some only a subset of vectors. For some of the counter-
measures it is not possible to define attack vectors that they mitigate, as the improve-
ment in security is indirect. For example a good cyber security program improves the 
skills and knowledge of employees in general, but how it improves the security of the 
system depends on the contents and objectives of the program. 
Table 6. Suggested measures to improve cyber security. 
Scope Countermeasure Improvement in 
Associated attack 
vectors 
System-wide 
Network design (DMZ, network 
segregation, VPN, VLAN) 
Access control, network security All 
Avoiding obscurity Transparency, maintenance All 
Authentication Access control, network security All 
Encryption 
Data security, access control, data 
integrity 
B, D, F, I, K, L 
Monitoring (SIEM, IDS, IPS) 
Intrusion detection, response time, 
recovery time 
Indirect 
Physical access control Access control, network security All except A 
Secure execution environment Data security & integrity D, H, J, N 
Regular backups Recovery time Indirect 
Patch management Fewer vulnerabilities All except M 
Hardening and secure configurations Fewer vulnerabilities All except M 
User policies 
Security awareness, fewer user 
errors 
Indirect 
Cyber security in contracts Clear responsibilities and roles Indirect 
Security awareness program Security awareness Indirect 
Incident response plan 
Response time, recovery time, 
responsibilities 
Indirect 
Change control process System stability, integrity Indirect 
EIS-specific 
Digital signatures (OSGi) Authenticity and integrity of bundles H, J, N 
Permission control (OSGi) Data security, access control H, J, N 
vSphere hardening (virtualization) Fewer vulnerabilities C, E, H, J, K, N 
Client authentication and 
authorization (ActiveMQ) 
Data security, access control B, D, F, G, I, K, L 
SSL encryption (ActiveMQ) Data security B, D, F, G, I, K, L 
Regular updates of system and AV 
(OS) 
Fewer vulnerabilities Indirect 
Hardening (OS) Fewer vulnerabilities Indirect 
Secure programming practices Fewer vulnerabilities, quality of code H, J, N 
Secure programmer certificates Quality of code, credibility H, J, N 
 
Table 6 offers a wide variety of different security measures. It is by no means necessary 
to implement all of the measures, but to study and test which solutions are functional 
and easily applicable. Finding a combination of solutions that complement each other 
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and cover the entire system is much more important than the sheer amount of measures 
used. Comprehensive security is created through quality, not through quantity. It is also 
important to work with all parties involved to achieve the optimal balance between se-
curity, reliability and usability. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this thesis suggest that work on cyber security of terminal automation 
systems is in the beginning, as it is on ICS systems in general. Until recently, cyber se-
curity has not been a major concern during design of ICS systems, but as the number of 
cyber attacks is increasing and the tools used in attacks are improving, it is clear that the 
threat of a cyber attack has quickly become significant. 
Most of the threats identified in this thesis are typical for ICS systems in the sense that 
they extend beyond the cyberspace and into the physical world. The threats were found 
to be focused on three problem areas: susceptibility to Denial-of-Service attacks, com-
munication in unencrypted, human-readable formats and vulnerability of OSGi bundles. 
These issues are characteristic to systems with limited computing resources and little 
tolerance for delays or packet loss. 
The conflict between cyber security, usability of the system and real-time requirements 
has been widely discussed on the field of ICS security and the same issue was identified 
in this thesis as well. The conflict seems to be one of the most often used justifications 
for not implementing security, so overcoming this issue would be a notable step for-
ward. Part of the solution would be improvement on the performance of cyber security 
products. For example encryption protocols that are light enough to operate on a per-
formance-limited PLC without significant delay are not available yet. 
Another part of the solution would be improving the security aspect of the ICS compo-
nents themselves. For example PLCs are often criticized by security professionals as 
some of them lack critical security functionality. Even the most secure components do 
not provide security if the system isn’t well-designed and therefore the ultimate respon-
sibility is in the hands of the system designers. In the life-cycle of a terminal automation 
system, security should be implemented as early as possible. The later in the life-cycle 
implementation happens, the harder it will be and consequently the costs go up. 
Designing a terminal automation system usually is a joint venture between the terminal 
operator and multiple system or component providers. Division of responsibilities be-
tween parties is not implicit, and if responsibility for security has not been explicitly 
assigned, gaps in security can be expected. Even though this thesis has been written 
from the viewpoint of a system provider, the security measures presented shouldn’t nec-
essarily be the responsibility of the provider. What’s important is that all parties in-
volved are committed to providing a secure system and are able to collaborate in order 
to achieve that target. 
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This thesis covers a variety of different measures to improve cyber security. While from 
the security viewpoint it would be optimal to implement as many of the measures as 
possible, in reality it just isn’t feasible because of the added cost and complexity. In-
stead, it is recommended to choose a few items that are relatively simple to implement 
and provide a good baseline for further security improvements. 
In many ways introducing cyber security to terminal automation systems can be com-
pared to implementing physical safety to the same systems. Both security and safety 
require compromises on efficiency and ease of use, and if either of them fails, conse-
quences can be significant. It is typical for security incidents in terminal automation 
environments to have physical consequences, so it would make sense to develop both 
safety and security to complement each other. Currently, maturity of safety features is a 
long way ahead of security features, so to develop security, it would be useful to see 
what kind of steps were taken to establish the current status of safety. Implementing 
high-quality safety solutions has become an industry standard and cyber security should 
be brought up to that same level. 
While the maritime sector has not been very active on the cyber security front, there has 
been significant advancement made for example in the sectors of gas and oil delivery, 
nuclear power and wastewater systems. These sectors are important components of the 
critical infrastructure and therefore they have been strictly regulated and supervised in 
terms of cyber security. Once these sectors have been brought up to a high level of secu-
rity, the focus is likely to shift to other components of critical infrastructure, such as 
transport. 
Some instances, such as GAO [16] and ENISA [36] have already stated that more regu-
lation and collaboration is required to improve cyber security on the maritime sector. A 
recent report also raises the issue of cyber threats in transportation sector in general 
[129]. This suggests that in the near future stricter requirements will also be set for se-
curity of terminal automation systems and the ability to meet or exceed these require-
ments sooner than competitors can be seen as a competitive advantage. 
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APPENDIX A: ATTACK TREES 
The attack trees below describe different attack vectors that can be used to attack the 
External Interface Service (EIS) of Kalmar’s terminal automation system. There are 
three main goals (roots) for attacks: Denial of Service (DoS), moving Container Han-
dling Equipment (CHE) and data leakage. The trees have been broken up to smaller 
sections so that they can be presented. Certain parts of attacks, such as gaining 
knowledge on the target system and gaining access to the system are a part of most at-
tacks, so to avoid repetition they are presented as separate trees as well. A gray box de-
notes that the vector is expanded in another tree. For example if a gray box says “access 
to the ICS network”, see the unauthorized access trees for the rest of the vector. 
Gaining knowledge on the target system is the beginning of most attacks, especially 
when the attack target has been chosen, but attack method still needs to be found. 
Knowledge on the network structure helps an attacker to find vulnerable devices and 
possible routes to whatever device or software the attacker is targeting. Knowledge on 
system operation and message structures helps the attacker figure out what actually 
needs to be attacked in order to achieve the goal. Figure A-1 shows how knowledge can 
be acquired. 
 
Figure A-1. Attack tree: gaining knowledge on target system. 
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Practically all attacks require unauthorized access to some part of the system. The ac-
cess can be either remote (Figure A-2) or physical (Figure A-3). Remote access can 
come from the Internet or from networks adjacent to the target network. Here remote 
access has been divided into two cases: access to the ICS network and access to the pro-
cess server. While access to the ICS network grants access to the data moving between 
devices in that network, access to the process server grants access also to data that never 
leaves the server. 
The easiest way to access the ICS network from the Internet would be by using one or 
more intrusion tools that are specifically made to find vulnerable points on the outside 
perimeter of the network. Nowadays such tools have easy-to-use interfaces and are pub-
licly available, so such attacks are likely to occur. Another possibility would be mal-
ware infection: a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) could be used to open a command and 
control connection to the ICS network. The RAT could be delivered to the system for 
example in a USB-drive or through an Internet browser. It is also possible for malware 
to propagate from the office network, which might be an easier target for an attacker to 
compromise first. 
 
Figure A-2. Attack tree: unauthorized remote access. 
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Physical access means that the attacker is able to physically touch the target. Physically 
accessing the ICS network practically means plugging in to a switch or a router to cap-
ture and inject messages or using one of the desktops connected to the network. This of 
course means that the attacker must first be able to access the premises where these de-
vices are located. Physical access to the process server room would mean access to the 
process server and to all data on the server. For example social engineering, bribing or 
intimidation could be used to access the server room. 
Access to the container yard would make it possible to open containers and find out 
what is inside them, which of course is useful information for example when attempting 
to steal containers. The access control system managing access to the yard could be ex-
ploited by forging access control messages, or by stealing or forging an ID card that is 
used to identify anyone entering the yard. All of the physical attacks would be signifi-
cantly easier for employees who already have the required access credentials. 
 
Figure A-3. Attack tree: unauthorized physical access. 
First of the three identified main goals of an attacker is Denial of Service (DoS). DoS 
attacks are generally easier to carry out than other attacks, so there are quite a few attack 
vectors. DoS attacks can be carried out on purpose, but they can also be launched by 
accident for example by incompetent employees. In flooding attacks (see Figure A-4) 
the attacker sends more messages than the receiver can handle, which makes the receiv-
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er incapable of responding to other messages in time. Such attacks are simple to execute 
as ready-made tools exist. All devices that are visible to the Internet are susceptible to 
random attackers, who scan the Internet for suitable targets. Therefore devices that need 
to be accessed from the Internet should be configured so that they can only be accessed 
from certain IP addresses, effectively making them invisible to others. 
Once inside the ICS network, it is possible to interfere with communications of the net-
work. Network devices can be attacked in different ways to change how network pack-
ets are routed. Physically damaging a network device naturally stops the traffic through 
that device entirely, but misconfiguration, spoofing and malware attacks can result in 
packets delivered to wrong places either constantly or intermittently. Especially inter-
mittent issues are difficult to track down and solve, so such attacks would last longer 
than problems caused by a broken device. 
 
Figure A-4. Attack tree: flooding attacks and communication interference. 
Container Handling Equipment (CHE) colliding with other objects will force the termi-
nal operator to halt the automated container handling, so collisions can be seen as DoS 
attacks, even though the motive might actually be causing financial harm (Figure A-5). 
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As the container move requests and other high-level instructions to CHE are given by 
EIS, manipulating these instructions may result in collisions, even when safety mecha-
nisms are activated. In theory, the system is aware of all static obstacles on the container 
yard, but if there are any other obstacles on the yard, a CHE might collide with them. 
For example moving a container to a place where it wouldn’t normally be and then re-
moving it from the container map of CHEs would make it “invisible”. 
Editing the container map also offers attack vectors other than collisions (Figure A-5). 
If an attacker adds randomly new container instances to the system without their physi-
cal counterparts, CHEs will start driving around looking for them. Removing container 
instances from the map will become a problem when one of these “invisible” containers 
needs to be moved as a part of another move, for example when the “invisible” contain-
er is on top of the container that needs to be moved. 
 
Figure A-5. Attack tree: physical damage and editing container map. 
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When considering EIS, nuking attacks (Figure A-6) are basically attacks that somehow 
prevent operation of EIS or the process server, which means that access to the server is 
required. Once an attacker has access to the process server, shutting down the Operating 
System (OS) or the virtualization environment is the matter of having high enough priv-
ileges to kill processes on the server. Typically in an industrial setting most or all users 
have administrative privileges for easier maintenance, so gaining access to the server is 
usually enough. The same goes for removing vital system data, such as configuration 
files or other files that are necessary for the system to keep running. 
Freezing OSGi bundles is a more complicated task and requires the ability to install new 
bundles on the server. Creating a malicious bundle requires knowledge of how OSGi 
works, but as was discussed in Sub-section 4.3.1, there are vulnerabilities in OSGi that 
allow bundles to be frozen. 
 
Figure A-6. Attack tree: nuking attacks. 
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The second main goal identified in this thesis is moving a CHE. Being able to move a 
CHE means that it is also possible to move containers. When exploiting EIS to move 
containers, the most convenient way is to craft messages that appear to be coming from 
the Terminal Operating System (TOS) and inject these messages to the ICS network 
(Figure A-7). An attacker can either create new messages or modify existing ones. 
When modifying existing messages, one doesn’t need to worry about the syntax of the 
entire message as only small adjustments are needed, but one has to be able to intercept 
and modify messages. When creating new messages, the attacker must understand the 
exact structure of the messages, but interception of messages is not necessary. It is also 
possible to give multiple move requests at once using a job list. Sending multiple move 
requests at once shortens the time that the attacker needs to be present or have access to 
the ICS network, which lessens the likelihood of getting caught. 
 
Figure A-7. Attack tree: move CHE by injecting instructions to the ICS network. 
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There is also another way to move CHE: exploiting OSGi (Figure A-8). Exploiting 
OSGi to modify data is similar to freezing OSGi bundles, but in order to be able to 
modify data, an attacker would have to understand how other bundles work. This infor-
mation can’t really be obtained from the system itself, so this attack vector requires ei-
ther a knowledgeable insider or stealing information from other sources. Of course the 
attacker must also possess the required knowledge to create a malicious bundle that ex-
ploits a vulnerability in OSGi and makes controlled changes to the data. 
Even though interfering with network packets directly may seem more convenient than 
exploiting OSGi, this method has its advantages. For example if the connection between 
TOS and EIS was protected with a VPN tunnel, the messages wouldn’t be accessible 
using simple MitM-attacks, but the messages would again be unencrypted once they 
reach EIS. Therefore VPN wouldn’t protect the communication from OSGi exploits. 
Also an OSGi exploit would presumably be more difficult to detect than a MitM-attack, 
which would help the attacker to stay undetected longer.  
 
Figure A-8. Attack tree: move CHE through OSGi exploit. 
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The third and final main goal of a cyber attack is data leakage. In the scope of this thesis 
this goal is divided in two sub-goals: leakage of container information and leakage of 
process data. Process data would most likely be stolen by capturing data between EIS 
and Fault Management and Diagnostics System (FMDS) or Marine Telematics System 
(MTS), both of which produce data about the state and performance of the system (Fig-
ure A-9). As the data is not encrypted, capturing the data isn’t that difficult in itself, but 
access to the ICS network must be obtained first. 
Container information is an essential part of attack vectors where containers are moved. 
There are two ways to obtain container information from the system: directly from in-
side EIS (Figure A-9), or by capturing messages between EIS and other system compo-
nents (Figure A-10). If the attacker has access to the process server, it is again possible 
to use an OSGi vulnerability. The attack vector is basically the same as when moving 
CHE and the same exploit could be used for both purposes. As container information is 
required when moving containers, these attacks are likely to occur simultaneously. 
 
Figure A-9. Attack tree: stealing container information and process data. 
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Container information can also be obtained from communication between EIS and other 
components of the system. Data can either be captured until required information has 
been found, or certain messages can be injected to the network in order to invoke de-
sired replies. For example sending a map synchronization request to EIS invokes a reply 
that includes ID of each container on the yard. Using the IDs obtained, an attacker can 
then request the location of a container. 
Container information can also be obtained by physically accessing the container yard, 
as was described in Figure A-3. By accessing the yard, attackers can determine which 
containers they want to steal and then use a cyber attack to move the container for ex-
ample on a trailer. 
 
Figure A-10. Attack tree: more ways to steal container information. 
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